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THE GEOGRAPHY OF JUSTICE WORMHOLES: DILEMMAS FROM
PROPERTY AND CRIMINAL LAW
HARI M. OSOFSKv*

Falling into a black hole has become one of the horrors of science
fiction. In fact, black holes can now be said to be really matters of science
fact.
Of course, where the science fiction writers really go to town is on
what happens if you do fall into a black hole. A common suggestion is
that if the black hole is rotating,you can fall through a little hole in
space-time [(a wormhole)] and out into anotherregion of the universe...
I'm sorry to disappointprospective galactic tourists, but this scenario
doesn't work: if you jump into a black hole, you will get torn apart and
crushed out of existence. However, there is a sense in which the particles
that make up your body do carry on into another universe. I don't know
if it would be much consolation to someone being made into spaghetti in a
black hole to know that his particles might survive.
-Stephen Hawking'
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Caroline Forell, Ibrahim Gassama, Leslie Harris, Demian Hommel, Janet Koven
Levit, Michelle McKinley, Lillian Aponte Miranda, Alexander Murphy, Austen
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Tsai and Lua Kamal Yuille for their very insightful feedback on drafts. The piece
also benefited from input during presentations at the 2007 University of Colorado
School of Law Property Works in Progress Conference, 2007 Berlin Law and
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scale, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington, LatCrit XII, University of
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(Stephen Hawking ed., Gene Stone prep., 1992).
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INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF JUSTICE WORMHOLES

HIS Article explores justice wormholes, 2 which like the rotating black
holes that Hawking describes, threaten to tear apart and crush their

inhabitants as they transport them to another dimension. These wormholes are governmentally-constructed links between legal spaces devoid of

the supposedly familiar guarantees of procedural or substantive protection. They confirm that "legal justice"5 is a concept that depends on the
proper interrelationship of "place," "space" and "time." 4 If one is unlucky
enough to be in the wrong place, at the wrong time, under the wrong legal
5
construct, one is in danger of "being made into spaghetti."
Property and criminal law provide particularly rich areas in which to
consider this wormhole problem. Both areas of law are ones in which sovereign power is especially strong. All legally-protected property rights in
,he United States originate from the federal sovereign, which obtained
those rights through conquest. 6 Criminal law helps to maintain the order
necessary to the functioning of a democratic society, and its promulgation
and enforcement is generally recognized as a core competency of government. 7 Although U.S. property and criminal law generally attempt to balance the sovereign against private rights in a way consistent with
2. Wormholes are "tunnels that link distant parts of space and time." MICHIO
KAKU,

HYPERSPACE:

A

SCIENTIFIC

ODYSSEY THROUGH

PARALLEL

UNIVERSES,

TIME

WARPS, AND THE TENTH DIMENSION, at x (1994). This Article uses the term "wormhole" rather than "black hole" to connote not only crushing force, but also transportation to a different spatio-temporal configuration.
3. 'Justice" is a term with contested meanings expressed through an extensive
scholarly literature in multiple disciplines. This Article uses the term 'justice"
broadly, encompassing both substantive and procedural aspects, in a sense that
harkens back to the Justinian notion of a legal system dedicated to continually
giving people what they deserve. See J. INST. 1.1 (533) ("lustitia est constans et
perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuens. luris prudentia est divinarum atque
humanarum rerum notitia, iusti atque iniustiscientia."). For examples of some recent
works exploring intertwined concepts of social and legal justice, see AIT ATRI, GANDHI'S VIEW OF LEGAL JUSTICE (2007); IMAGINARY BOUNDARIES OFJUSTICE: SOCIAL AND
LEGAL JUSTICE ACROSS DISCIPLINES (Ronnie Lippens ed., 2004).
4. The meaning of these terms is explored in more detail in the introduction
to Part II. See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. These terms are used in a
range of contexts in the geography literature. For two very different analyses engaging the spaces of the international economy, compare Alexander B. Murphy,
The Sovereign State System as Political-TerritorialIdeal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONTRACT 81, 107 (Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds., 1996), with DAVID HARVEY, SPACES OF CAPITAL:
TOWARDS A CRITICAL GEOGRAPHY 369 (2001).
5. HAWKING, supra note 1, at 86.
6. For an interesting analysis of property and sovereignty, see Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Towards a Cultural Geography of Ownership, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1996).
7. Cf Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 361 (1993) (describing police
power as "peculiarly sovereign" in nature).
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democratic principles, both contain lacunae in which categories of people
face systems of radically unequal justice.8
More specifically, this Article focuses on the comparative geography
of two contexts in which wormholes have flourished: the federal government's relationship with indigenous peoples and its treatment of "War on
Terror" detainees. In the first case example, two international tribunals
have attempted to intervene in the U.S. government's treatment of Mary
and Carrie Dann, Western Shoshone grandmothers who have had their
traditional land expropriated-outside of the system generally governing
takings because of the Indian Law context-and then been sued in trespass for using it. 9 The second example focuses on the recently-convicted
Jos6 Padilla's oscillating status as a criminal defendant or an "enemy combatant," including ever-shifting charges and procedural barriers to challenging his designation.1 0 These wormholes contain complex, multiscalar
geographies in which the possibilities for substantive or procedural justice 11 depend upon interactions among branches and levels of government, as well as nongovernmental actors. 12 Both reflect a long history of
13
differential treatment of categories of people designated as "other,"
8. For a narrative of this due process dynamic from multiple perspectives, see
Stephanie Weinstein & Arthur Wolfson, Toward a Due Process of Narrative:Before You
Lock My Love Away, Please Let Me Testify, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 511 (2006).
9. For an analysis of the Dann case, see infra notes 28-105 and accompanying
text.
10. For an analysis of the Padillacase, see infra notes 106-63 and accompanying text.
11. The concept of due process has been contested in the scholarly literature.
For example, Susan Klein explains:
I fully agree that both history and text support the idea that due process
has independent life in both the criminal and civil contexts apart from
the particular provisions in the Bill of Rights ....

The line between

substantive and procedural due process is not clearly drawn. The Court
has identified certain legislative and executive action that simply cannot
be countenanced regardless of the procedures used ....

Regardless of

the intent of the framer's [sic] of the Bill of Rights and drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has utilized the fundamental fairness doctrine since reconstruction, and is unlikely to stop now.
Susan R. Klein, Miranda's Exceptions in a Post-Dickerson World, 91 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 567, 573-74, 573 n.34 (2001). Although this Article acknowledges
the substantive and procedural aspects of these cases and the blurriness between
them, a full exploration of due process is beyond the scope of its analysis.
12. I have explored a similar map of relationships in the context of climate
change litigation. See Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation:
Implications for TransnationalRegulatory Governance, 83 WASH U. L.Q. 1789 (2005).
Numerous scholars working at the intersection of international law and other disciplines have advanced theories to describe this phenomenon in the context of litigation. For example, Anne-Marie Slaughter has analyzed the increasing
interconnection among courts around the world. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A
Global Community of Courts, 44 I-HAv. INT'L L.J. 191 (2003); Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103 (2000).
13. For a comparison between historical treatment of immigrants and the
War on Terror, see Leti Volpp, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and Alien Citizenship,
103 MICH. L. REv. 1595 (2005) (book review).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 4
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53: p. 117

but in current variations that reflect the post-9-11 War on Terror and
4
processes of globalization.'
These examples and their legal context are emblematic of a broader
phenomenon that persists across many areas of the law. A well-traveled
terrain in judicial opinions and scholarly literature explores the appropriateness of constructing categories that force people outside of the "normal" protections and the minimum requirements that justice and the law
require in such circumstances.' 5 An in-depth analysis of these two representative geographies, however, reveals more specific concerns about the
slipperiness of these legal spaces and provides the basis for engaging normative questions about the boundaries of justice in the current environment. The Dann sisters and Padilla-all U.S. citizens-move inside and
outside of legal spaces over the course of their cases such that their possibilities for relief seem to hinge more upon how they are classified and
what tribunal they happen to be before at a particular moment than any
consistent principle of justice. Moreover, "enemy" status haunts them
throughout their ordeal, with Mary and Carrie Dann facing the legal structures resulting from this country's conquest of its indigenous inhabitants
and with Jos6 Padilla navigating the maze created by our more recent War
on Terror.
The intersecting vectors of place, space and time-themselves ambiguous concepts which are explored in depth in Part 1116-running through
these cases raise foundational questions about the way in which socio-legal
constructions of national power create and maintain justice wormholes.
The nation-state dominates both stories. Through dynamics among its
three branches, the federal government repeatedly reconstructs the justice
problems represented in these two cases and resists efforts at outside intervention. And yet powerful advocacy inside and outside of those formal
constructions takes place in both cases. How should we view the nationstate in these narratives? Is it an enclosed space in which these controversies take place, or are its boundaries more porous? What is the best way to
characterize the web of formal and informal relationships that run
through the nation-state and interact with it? Does our conception of the
nation-state impact the possibilities for deconstructingjustice wormholes?
14. See infra notes 23-163 and accompanying text.
15. The literature on this issue specific to the Dann and Padillacases is reviewed infra notes 23-163 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the confluence of the War on Terror and indigenous rights, see Robert Odawi Porter, Tribal
Disobedience, 11 TEx.J. C.L. & C.R. 137 (2006). For an exploration of civil liberties
in the context of the War on Terror, see Bruce Ackerman, Terrorism and the Constitutional Order, 75 FoRDHAM L. REv. 475 (2006); Neal Katyal, Equality in the War on
Terror, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1365 (2007); Symposium, War, Terrorism, and Torture: Limits
on PresidentialPower in the 21st Century, 81 IND. L.J. 1139 (2006).
16. These terms have a variety of different meanings, as discussed in depth in
Part II, infra notes 23-163 and accompanying text. I use them in their most physical sense, as well as more conceptually, throughout this Article.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol53/iss1/4

4

2008]

Osofsky: The Geography of Justice Wormholes: Dilemmas from Property and Cr
THE GEOGRAPHY OF JUSTICE WORMHOLES

After exploring three possible models of the nation-state, Part III argues that an enmeshed model of the United States, grounded in network
theory and legal pluralism, 17 provides a fuller set of options for addressing
the justice failures exemplified in the two cases. An analysis that views the
U.S. federal government as constituted by and in constant engagement
with a myriad of actors at multiple scales allows for a deeper understanding of its formal and informal legal choices. Through such an approach,
possibilities for justice exist even when formal legal structures constituting
the wormholes are intractable. The Danns have yet to receive permission
to continue their traditional way of life on their land, but public pressure
helps to constrain the behavior of the federal government and corporate
entities on Western Shoshone land. Although the formal legal system
never reviewed the appropriateness of Padilla's designation, the protests
over his treatment likely played a role in his return to the criminal justice
system.
These dilemmas about how we should regard the United States in the
narrative of these cases leads back to the normative difficulty with which
the Article begins: What are and should be the boundaries of the exceptionalism, both intra-nation-state and inter-nation-state, that runs through
these cases? The historical and ongoing lessons regarding governmental
treatment of those labeled as threatening-for example, Fred Korematsu's
conviction during the World War II Japanese internment was not vacated
until 19841 8-indicate that the spaces for justice at times fail to balance
adequately or consistently the values of liberty and security.
The Article concludes that such a balance would require greater integration of these exceptional spaces-reached through 'justice wormholes"-into the way in which our legal system generally approaches the
issues involved. For example, as the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights details, the procedure for expropriation applied to the
Danns would not have passed muster under U.S. takings jurisprudence.1 9
In the current post-Keo 2 ° environment, the question of what "public use"
entails is hotly contested. 2 1 But because of the Indian Claims Commission
17. See infra notes 162-223 and accompanying text.
18. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
("[Korematsu] ... stands as a caution that in times of distress the shield of military

necessity and national security must not be used to protect governmental actions
from close scrutiny and accountability.").
19. SeeDann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 113/
01 144 (2001), available at http://www.cldh.org/annualrep/2002eng/usa.1 1140.
html.
20. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 476 (2005) (holding that
"public use" is not violated when land is transferred from one private owner to
another as part of an urban redevelopment plan).
21. For examples of the discourse over the implications of Kelo, see Charles E.
Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argumentfor Banning
Economic Development Takings, 29 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 491 (2006); Daniel H.
Cole, Why Kelo Is Not Good News for Local Plannersand Developers, 22 GEORGIA STATE
L. REV. 803 (2006); Ilya Somin, Controlling the GraspingHand: Economic Development
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context in which the Dann case occurred, these issues never meaningfully
arose. Instead, according to the Inter-American Commission petitionersadvocating on behalf of the Danns-"the United States argued that Western Shoshone aboriginal and treaty rights to land had been lawfully extinguished by gradual encroachment." 22 Under such a theory, the U.S.
government was able to establish the transfer of ownership of large swaths
of land with little regard for whether the land was physically taken or any

public purpose was actually involved.
Addressing wormholes and exceptional spaces should at the very least
include: (1) clearer minimum protections for fundamental liberties; (2)
greater core consistency in legal structures and judicial application of
them; (3) increased protection of those at risk of being categorized as
other; and (4) more complete mapping of situations that takes into account multiple narratives. Geography's focus on spatio-temporal context
and exploration of the nuances of scale allows for a deeper understanding
of how basic protections ofjustice have been eliminated in these cases and
what reconstructing them would entail. Geographic analysis cannot force
the U.S. federal government to treat the Danns or Padilla differently, but
its approach may help in efforts to reshape these spaces so that they contain a justice floor rather than a wormhole.
This Article's law and geography approach to these justice wormholes
thus serves two overlapping purposes. It enables a thicker description of
how these problems are constructed and possible ways of viewing them.
This descriptive analysis in turn raises normative questions about how
cases like the Dann and Padilla ones should be handled. The Article argues that this dynamic process of interrogation and reconstruction will
help to provide the conceptual grounding for fairer legal categorization in
the future.
II.

TALES OF

Two

WORMHOLES

This Part describes the Dann and Padilla cases using the vectors of
place, space and time. Before moving into this analysis, however, some
clarification of these terms is in order. The relationship among place,
space and time has long been contested across disciplines through ongo23
ing debates over scientific naturalism and modernism/post-modernism.
Takings After Kelo, SuP. CT. ECON. REv. (forthcoming) (draft on file with author);
Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the PoliticalResponse to Kelo (forthcoming) (draft on file with author); Amanda W. Goodwin, Note, Rejecting the Return to
Blight in Post-Kelo State Legislation, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 177 (2007).
22. See Dann, Case 11.140
47.
23. For analyses of modernism and postmodernism in the context of law, see
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO
POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 13 (2000); GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN
LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END (1995). For analyses of modernism and postmodernism in geography, see DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNrry: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL CHANGE
(1989); EDWARD W. SOJA, POSTMODERN GEOGRAPHIES: THE REASSERTION OF SPACE IN
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As a starting matter, definitional problems abound. Is "place" simply a
24
Should "space" be viewed as
physical location or is it a social construct?

the matrix in which places are located, or be used to describe legal, economic, political and social structures? 25 How can our general perception
of time's Newtonian forward march be reconciled with Einstein's more
26
complex vision?
The definitional questions only become more difficult when these
ideas are tied together in a socio-legal context. As geographers Eric Sheppard and Robert McMaster explain:
Theoretically, more and more human geographers have come to
question the adequacy of Euclidean coordinate systems as a way
of representing space and time. They are not concerned with
the fact that the earth's surface is more accurately represented by
spherical than Cartesian coordinates, but with the question of
what distance means in the social realm. Human geographers
agree that the actual distance between two places may have little
to do with the miles separating them. Black and white neighborhoods may be only across the street from one another. Yet the
effective social distance separating them, as indicated by minimal
social interaction between them, can be enormous. Similarly, although New York and London are far apart in Euclidean space,
in other senses, as measured by flows of money, people, and into one another than either is to
formation, they are much closer
27
away.
miles
few
a
other cities
Understanding dynamics among place, space and time thus requires an
engagement of both material and conceptual aspects of them. Namely,
these cases are adjudicated and have facts tied to specific physical places at
CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY (1989). For an analysis of scientific naturalism, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRIsis OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY' SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM
& THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973).

24. See John A. Agnew & James S. Duncan, Introduction to THE POWER OF
PLACE: BRINGING TOGETHER GEOGRAPHICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATIONS 1, 1
(John A. Agnew &James S. Duncan eds., 1989).
25. See DOREEN MASSEY, FOR SPACE 62-99 (2005); YI-Fu TUAN, SPACE AND
PLACE: THE PERSPECTIVE OF EXPERIENCE 6 (1977); Helen Couclelis, Location, Place,
Region, and Space, in GEOGRAPHY'S INNER WORLDS: PERVASIVE THEMES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN GEOGRAPHY 215, 215 (Ronald F. Abler et al. eds., 1992); Michael R.
Curry, On Space and Spatial Practice in Contemporary Geography, in CONCEPTS IN
HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 3-32 (Carville Earle et al. eds., 1996).
26. For analyses of the transition from valorizing time to exploring the importance of space, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, Questions on Geography, in POWER/KNowLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977, 63-77 (Colin Gordon
ed., 1980); SoJA, supra note 23, at 3-4, 31-35; Michel Foucault, Of Other Spaces, 16

22 (Jay Miskowiec trans., 1986).
27. Robert B. McMaster & Eric Sheppard, Introduction: Scale and Geographic
Inquiry, in SCALE AND GEOGRAPHIC INQUIRY- NATURE, SOCIETY AND METHOD 1, 15
(Eric Sheppard & Robert B. McMaster eds., 2004).
DIACRITICS
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particular points in time, but occur in a broader context that helps to
determine how that map matters.
In recognition of that duality, the following case analyses attempt to
provide a holistic engagement of how these vectors intersect. They treat
place as a physical location, but also as a cultural construct. Space references institutional and legal structures, and the possibilities for informal

interaction that can occur within them. Time includes concrete tacticsdelay, procedural filing barriers, strategic release of information-but also
the histories that undergird the current wormholes in our justice system.
Moreover, as with the concepts themselves, problems of place, space and
time bleed into one another. The accounts of this Part attempt to illustrate that blurriness and intertwinement while analyzing each aspect of
these cases' geography.
A.

The Dann Sisters Trespass on Their Own Land

This Section explores the geography of a convoluted series of legal
conflicts through which, even with the intervention of two international
tribunals, the United States views the Danns as trespassing on Western
Shoshone ancestral land that their family has been using since the
1920s. 28 For clarity, Appendix I provides a chronology of the intertwined
legal proceedings.
Beginning in the mid-1970s, Mary and Carrie Dann have fought a legal battle-which has outlived Mary Dann-to save the ancestral land that
their family has long used. Their father started herding livestock on open
range located on Western Shoshone land in Crescent Valley, Nevada in
the 1920s. 2 9 The Dann sisters themselves began herding there in the
28. For scholarly analysis of this case, see Derek de Bakker, Note, The Court of
Last Resort: American Indians in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 11 CARDozo
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 939 (2004); Allison M. Dussias, Squaw Drudges, Farm Wives, and
the Dann Sisters' Last Stand: American Indian Women's Resistance to Domestication and
the Denial of Their Property Rights, 77 N.C. L. REv. 637 (1999); John D. O'Connell,
Constructive Conquest in the Courts: A Legal History of the Western Shoshone Lands Struggle-1861 to 1991, 42 NAT. REsOURCESJ. 765, 787-92 (2002);Jo M. Pasqualucci, The
Evolution of InternationalIndigenous Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System,
6 HUM. RTs. L. REv. 281 (2006); John W. Ragsdale, Jr., IndividualAboriginalRights,
9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 323 (2004); Deborah Schaaf &Julie Fishel, Mary and Carrie
Dann v. United States at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Victory for
Indian Land Rights and the Environment, 16 TUL. ENVrL. L.J. 175 (2002); see also S.
James Anaya, Indian Givers: What Indigenous Peoples Have Contributedto International
Human Rights Law, 22 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 107 (2006); S. James Anaya & Robert
A. Williams, Jr., The Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights over Lands and Natural
Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 33
(2001); Lorie M. Graham, Resolving Indigenous Claims to Self-Determination, 10 ILSA
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 385 (2004); Austen L. Parrish, Changing Territoriality, Fading
Sovereignty, and the Development of Indigenous Rights, AM. INDIAN L. REv. (forthcoming) (draft manuscript on file with author).
29. See United States v. Dann, 873 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1987).
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1940s. 30 Although the United States expropriated significant portions of
Western Shoshone land over the course of the 1800s by granting patents
contend that their land was never
to settlers moving West, the Dann sisters
31
physically taken through this process.
Rather, the Dann sisters' difficulties began in 1951 when representatives from the Te-Moak Tribe,3 2 who the U.S. federal government recognized as qualified to represent the Western Shoshone, made a claim for
damages to the Indian Claims Commission ("ICC") for the expropriation
of tribal lands.3 3 The Danns protested the inclusion of their land at the
time, but did not formally intervene in the proceedings themselves until
34
1974, after the ICC's determination of title extinction and valuation.
The ICC ruled the Danns' intervention untimely, and then proceeded to
finalize the compensation award over this land without evidence that the
Danns' property, in particular, had been taken.3 5 Multiple determinations by U.S. federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, resulted in
the U.S. Bureau of Land Management having the right to cite the Danns
in 1974 for trespassing and in the federal government seizing their cattle
36
on numerous occasions.
Despite the intervention of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, the Bureau proceeded in the 1990s to impound much of
the Dann sisters' livestock.3 7 The Inter-American Commission ruled in
2002 that the process by which the United States expropriated the Danns'
land had failed to ensure their "right to property under conditions of
equality." 38 The U.S. government rejected the Inter-American Commission's decision, 39 and allegedly has attempted to privatize Western Sho30. See id. For a map showing the location of Crescent Valley, see Eureka
County Vicinity Map, http://www.co.eureka.nv.us/graphic/map01.jpg. For a map
indicating the locations of Native American reservations and colonies in Nevada,
see Nevada Department of Transportation, Indian Reservations and Colonies in
Nevada (2007), available at http://www.nevadadot.com/traveler/maps/State
Maps/pdfs/ReservationColonies.pdf.
31. Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 113/01,
39 (2001), available at http://www.cldh.org/annualrep/2002eng/usa.11140.
html.
32. The name of this tribe is used inconsistently in the case documents. I use
"Te-Moak Tribe" in the text because this is name the tribe uses in its materials. See
Te-Moak Tribe of the Western Shoshone Indians of Nevada, http://www.temoak
tribe.com (last visited Oct. 27, 2007).
33. See Dann, Case 11.140, 89.
34. See United States v. Dann, 572 F.2d 222, 225 (9th Cir. 1978).
35. See id. at 223, 225.
36. See id. at 223.

37. Dann, Case 11.140,
38. See id.

2, 42.

172.

39. See Response of the Government of the United States to October 10, 2002
Report No. 53/02 Case No. 11.140 (Mary and Carrie Dann), available at http://
www.cidh.org/Respuestas/USA.11140.htm; Observations of the Government of
the United States to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report No.
113/01 of October 15, 2001 concerning Case No. 11.140 (Mary and Carrie Dann)
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008
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shone ancestral lands to allow for multinational extractive and energy
activities, has planned destructive activities at spiritually or culturally signif40
icant sites and has resumed underground nuclear testing.
In response to these claims, the United Nations Committee for the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 2006 urged the United States to
take a variety of interim measures to avoid continuing the expropriation
and transfer to private energy and extractive interests "until a final decision or settlement is reached on the status, use and occupation of Western
Shoshone ancestral lands in accordance with due process of law and the
State party's obligations under the Convention" on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 4 1 In its April 2007 periodic report to the Committee,
the United States "maintain[ed] its position that the issues raised by certain Western Shoshone descendents are not appropriate for consideration
under early-warning measures and urgent procedures .... -42 The Committee responded in its February 2008 concluding observations: "While
noting the explanations provided by the State party with regard to the
situation of the Western Shoshone indigenous peoples," "the Committee
strongly regrets that the State Party has not followed up on the
recommendations."
1.

43

Place

Ties to place are at the core of the dispute in the Dann case. They
recur throughout the multiple narratives of the seemingly endless court
cases over this stretch of arid grazing land in Nevada. The most straightforward account of place is one steeped in materiality; 44 the fight is over
land that belonged to the Western Shoshone, that was subject to treaties
between tribes and the U.S. government, that the U.S. federal government
(Dec. 17, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/38647.htm ("The United
States rejects the Commission's Report No. 113/01 of October 15, 2001, in its entirety. The United States respectfully requests that the Commission publish the
following Response of the United States in the next Annual Report of the Commission, if Report No. 113/01 is published.") [hereinafter Observations].
40. See Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination [CERD], Res.
68/1, 7, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/DEC/1 (Apr. 11, 2006), available at http://
www.universalhumanrightsindex.org/documents/824/1127/document/en/pdf/
text.pdf.
41. See id. 10.
42. See Periodic Report of the United States of America to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Concerning the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, April 2007,
342, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/83517.pdf.
43. See Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination [CERD], Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties under Article 9 of the Convention,
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
19, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (Feb. 2008) (on file with author)
[hereinafter CERD Concluding Observations].
44. For a discussion of the deep ties that indigenous peoples' have to particular physical places, see S. JAMES

ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

104-07 (2d ed. 2000).
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claims to have expropriated, and that Mary and Carrie Dann and their
family have had as a home and the center of their livelihood.
From the beginning of the lawsuits, multiple parties have laid claim to
this physical place. At the Indian Claims Commission, tribal representatives sued the U.S. government for expropriating it and the Danns sought
to intervene late in that process to say that a portion of that land had not
been taken away. 45 When the tribal representatives subsequently changed
their position, this federally constituted tribunal tied to the U.S. governmental seat of power in Washington, D.C. deemed that reversal to be too
late. 4 6 The trespass case against the Danns moved up and down the fed-

eral courts as the Indian Claims Commission finalized the expropriation
47
and compensation.
The Danns' experience in the U.S. legal system was both
Kafkaesque 48 and Sisyphean. 49

They encountered a changed world in

which the fact that no one else was using their land did not seem to matter. In response, they repeatedly rolled legal boulders uphill only to have
courts knock them back down. Throughout this process, the slim possibility of relief hinged upon whether they had the formal right to represent
the status of this land despite the constraints of the act establishing the
Indian Claims Commission and of their late intervention 5 0-an effort that
they made before each tribunal that heard their claim. As Carrie Dann
expressed in a 2003 speech, "[o]ur land is not for sale. The United States
thinks it can do whatever it wants, but we know and our children and
grandchildren will know that we never sold our land." 51 Only the Ninth
45. See W. Shoshone Identifiable Group v. United States, 35 Ind. Cl. Comm.
457, 460 (1975).

46. SeeDann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 113/
01, 118 (2001), available at http://www.cldh.org/annualrep/2002eng/usa.1114
0.html.
47. For the federal court proceedings in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
and the U.S. Supreme Court, see United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39 (1985); 873
F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1989); 706 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1983); 572 F.2d 222 (9th Cir.
1978).

48. The Metamorphosis begins: "When Gregor Samsa woke up one morning
from unsettling dreams, he found himself changed in his bed into a monstrous
vermin." FRANz KAEKA, THE METAMORPHOSIS 3 (Stanley Corngold ed., trans., Bantam reissue ed. 2004). The Danns woke up to discover that their land, despite no
one else using it, had been taken before they were born.
49. In the Greek myth, the gods punished Sisyphus by making him endlessly
roll a boulder uphill; as Sisyphus approached the top of the mountain, the boulder
would escape from him and roll back down to the bottom. Camus used this myth,

as well as the work of Kafka, to expound upon the absurdity of modern life. See
ALBERT CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS AND OTHER ESSAYS (Justin O'Brien trans.,
Vintage International 1991).
50. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.

51. See Indian Law Resource Center Website, http://www.indianlaw.org/
main/projects/icm/wsdc (quoting Nov. 7, 2003 speech).
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Circuit Court of Appeals-overridden by the U.S. Supreme Court 52 -and
the Inter-American Commission 53 treated the land as potentially theirs on
54
the basis of their Western Shoshone identity.
The U.S. government, even after the Inter-American Commission decision, articulated an alternative perspective on who had the right to speak
for the land. Its observations in response to the Inter-American Commission stated:
The lands involved in this case are part of a much larger area that
was at issue in an action resolved by the Indian Claims Commission in 1977 .... The fundamental error evidenced throughout
the Commission decision is its factual assumption that the land
claim at issue in the Indian Claims Commission litigation represented an aggregation of individual claims and not a collective
55
tribal claim of the Western Shoshone.
The U.S. federal government recognized the tribal leaders-and not the
Danns-as the appropriate voice for the land at the point in time at which
the disputes were occurring; moreover, it expressed its own territorial authority, through all three branches of government and the special institutions created to address Native American land claims, to make that
decision, as well as the decision about whether it had effectively and legally
expropriated the land.
These conflicting narratives of the material space that this place occupies open larger questions about whose perspective matters and what narrative should be enshrined in law. The Danns' claim can be viewed as
stretching back to the pre-colonial spaces that the U.S. government altered through highly problematic means. 5 6 Multiple colonial narratives
attempt to justify this transformation of legal space while still laying claim
to democratic and civil libertarian values. 57 The question of whether tri52. See United State v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 51 (1985) (reversing Ninth Circuit's
holding).
53. See Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 113/
01 (2001), available at http://www.cldh.org/annualrep/2002eng/usa.11140.html.
54. See United States v. Dann, 572 F.2d 222, 225-27 (9th Cir. 1978). Complex
questions about the relationships among members of tribes, tribal decision-makers
and federal courts continue. For example, the First Circuit recently held that individual tribal members had standing to challenge a decision by a tribal government
in federal court. See Nulankeyutmonen Nkihtaqmikon v. Impson, No. 06-2733,
2007 WL 2685200 (1st Cir. Sept. 14, 2007).
55. See Observations, supra note 39, at Part I and Section II.A.
56. As noted by the Inter-American Commission, "the parties agree that at
some point the Western Shoshone had title to this territory as their ancestral
lands." Dann, Case 11.140, 100.
57. For an analysis of these narratives, see Sherene H. Razack, When Place Becomes Race, in RACE, SPACE, AND THE LAw: UNMAPPING A WHITE SETrLER SOCIETY 1-20
(Sherene H. Razack ed., 2002). For analyses of the complexities of reconciling
liberalism and republicanism with Indian Law, see Bethany R. Berger, Liberalism
and Republicanism in FederalIndian Law, 38 CONN. L. REv. 813 (2006); Erin Ruble &
Gerald Torres, "PerfectGood Faith,"5 NEv. L.J. 93 (2004).
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bal leaders should be speaking for the Danns' land could be viewed as
simply an intra-tribal dispute, as the U.S. account conveys, or as a vestige
and continuation of the colonial dismantling and reconstituting of Native
American's sociopolitical and legal spaces in which the U.S. federal government-through its statutes and judicial decisions-determines appropriate tribal representation. The right of U.S. federal courts to resolve the
dispute hinges on its claim to this place as part of the overall U.S. territory,
with Native sovereignty-despite its legally recognized separateness-buried within nation-state sovereignty.
Moreover, these very issues of perspective are controversial in part
because non-Native American voices continue to dominate the story of the
United States enshrined in history books. 58 Even efforts to provide indigenous peoples' perspectives in such accounts often frame the narrative in a
fashion in which meaningful inclusion remains elusive. 59 In both law
schools and the legal academy, Native Americans, as well as many other
communities of color, often experience marginalization through the structuring of multiple, relevant spaces. 6 0 Although an in-depth engagement
of these disputes is beyond the scope of this paper, 61 they provide a backdrop against which the material account of place in the Danns' case
should be understood. An analysis of place in the Danns' case thus bleeds
into issues of the spaces framing their dispute.
2.

Space

The dominant narrative described above often becomes embodied in
socio-political and legal structures. 62 Those structures in turn limit the
63
possibilities open to indigenous peoples whose land has been taken.
The Danns are trapped inside a legal system in which the expropriator
evaluates and validates its own expropriation with minimal responsiveness
to external condemnation of its behavior. This section engages those constraints by considering the spaces represented in the legal options available to the Danns.
58. See Razack, supra note 57, at 1-20.
59. See Carol Schick, Keeping the Ivory Tower White: Discourses of RacialDominaRACE, SPACE, AND THE LAw: UNMAPPING A WHITE SETTLER SOCIETY 99, 101
(Sherene H. Razack ed., 2002); see also Sheila Dawn Gill, The Unspeakability of Racism: Mapping Law's Complicity in Manitoba's Racialized Spaces, in RACE, SPACE, AND

tion, in

THE LAw: UNMAPPING A WHITE SETrLER SOCTE-ry

157, 162 (Sherene H. Razack ed.,

2002).
60. See Gill, supra note 59, at 162.

61. For an interesting discussion of how Native American legal determinations should interact with liberal notions of good governance, see Angela R. Riley,

Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1049 (2007).
62. See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geographies in

LegalAnalysis, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1841, 1861 (1994); Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: JurisdictionalFormationand Racial Segregation, 49

STAN.

L. REv.

1365, 1366 (1997); Razack, supra note 57, at 1.
63. See Razack, supra note 57, at 3, 5.
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Although the judicial dispute began in the Indian Claims Commission, this was not the beginning of the conflict over this land. The disposition of the land at the commencement of the legal proceedings was
determined through a series of treaties negotiated between the United
States and the Shoshone people in the mid-1800s. 64 These treaties, like so
many others between the United States and Native Americans, reflect the
unequal bargaining power that existed at that time. 6 5 More specifically,
the Treaty of Ruby Valley, signed in 1863, defined the boundaries of Western Shoshone land. 66 In 1872, President Hayes established a reservation

for the Western Shoshone at Duck Valley in an effort to address their
growing displacement. 67 This U.S. federal legal structure of treaties and
reservations, created through the executive and legislative branches, provides a space that bounds pre-colonial claims by indigenous peoples in the
U.S. legal system.
In 1946, the space to engage expropriation was further altered
through Congress's creation of the Indian Claims Commission (ICC). 68

This tribunal was established to adjudicate claims brought by Indian tribes
against the United States, including ones "arising from the taking of the
United States, whether as a result of a treaty of cession or otherwise, of
lands owned or occupied by the claimant without . . .payment . . .or

compensation. '69 The establishment of the ICC represented an opportunity for compensation for the taking of land, but also further constrained
spaces for redress. The ICC thus became a forum for getting compensation at historical rates, rather than present value, but not for preventing
such takings or demanding the return of land. Moreover, this structure
existed in the broader context of an ever-developing constitutional jurisprudence based on the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 70 Interestingly, one of the Inter-American Commission's criticisms of the U.S.
government was that it took the Danns' property without meeting the stan71
dards of its Takings jurisprudence.
As noted previously, the Danns were forced before the ICC because
the Te-Moak Tribe brought a claim in 1951 for damages regarding 22 million acres in Nevada that included the Danns' property. 72 Given the space
64. See United States v. Dann, 572 F.2d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1978).
65. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.

66. See Treaty of Ruby Valley G Boundaries, http://www.wsdp.org/images/
newemap.gif (last visited July 12, 2006) (displaying boundaries of Western Shoshone land).
67. See Dann, 572 F.2d at 224.
68. See Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 60 Stat.
1049 (1946).
69. Dann, 572 F.2d at 224 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 70a).
70. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
71. See Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/
02, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.117113/01 (2001),
144.
72. W. Shoshone Identifiable Group v. United States, 35 Ind. Cl. Comm. 457
(1975); see also supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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created by the ICC, the leaders did not request the land itself, which
73
would have been preferable, but simply compensation for its taking. After years of informal efforts to contest the ICC process, in 1974, a group of
Western Shoshone, which included the Danns, attempted unsuccessfully
to intervene formally at a late stage in the ICC process to remove their
land from the Te-Moak claim.7 4 They argued that (1) the title to this land
was never extinguished by encroachment; (2) the Te-Moak Tribe plaintiffs
did not represent the Western Shoshone and the petitioners did not wish
to accept compensation which would nullify future claims; and (3) there
was collusion between the cooperating Western Shoshone (The Western
Shoshone Identifiable Group) and the U.S. government in including land
75
of other tribes in this claim.
The ICC never reached the merits of the Danns' claim because it denied the requested stay on grounds of timeliness and standing. 76 Over the
course of the late 1970s, the ICC completed the final award of
$26,145,189.89, 77 the Court of Claims affirmed the award, 78 and the award
was certified for payment. 79 Through this process, the Danns' landwhich had not been encroached upon and which they continued to inhabit-was deemed to have been expropriated.
As the Danns attempted unsuccessfully to fight the ICC process,
additional federal governmental spaces began to close in upon them. The
Bureau of Land Management, a federal agency headquartered in Washington, D.C., cited them for trespassing on federal land in the Elko Grazing District by grazing without a permit. 80 The Danns defended
themselves by arguing that they and the Western Shoshone people, not
the U.S. government, beneficially owned the land and could not be excluded from it.8 1 The U.S. government responded that the ICC proceedings had determined that the aboriginal title was extinguished. 82 The
cases bounced up and down the federal court system, with the Supreme
Court determining that compensation had occurred once payment landed
in a Treasury account even though the funds had not been distributed to
73. See Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/
02, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.117113/01 (2001), 1 16.
74. See W Shoshone Identifiable Group, 35 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 477; see also

O'Connell, supra note 28, at 776-77.
75. See W Shoshone Indentifiable Group, 35 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 459-60, 464.
76. See id. at 463.
77. See W. Shoshone Identifiable Group v. United States, 40 Ind. Cl. Com.n.
318, 318 (1977), available at http://digital.library.okstate.edu/icc/v40/iccv40p453.
pdf.
78. SeeTemoack Band of W. Shoshone Indians v. United States, 593 F.2d 994,
1002 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
79. See Civil No. R-74-60 (Apr. 25, 1980).
80. See United States v. Dann, 572 F.2d 222, 223 (9th Cir. 1978).
81. See id.
82. See id.
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the Western Shoshone. 8 3 In addition, the Ninth Circuit limited the Danns'
84
Carrie Dann has declaims to land previously held by their ancestors.
scribed this set of proceedings as the U.S. government expropriating 85the
land and regarding its own acceptance of payment as compensation.
With no possibilities for redress that recognized their tribal claims
within the spaces provided by the U.S. government and faced with ongoing government harassment, the Danns attempted to step outside of these
86
As a member of the OrganizaU.S. governmentally-constituted spaces.
tion of American States, the U.S. has obligations to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and under the American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man. 8 7 Although the Danns succeeded in their
claim before the Commission by reframing the situation in terms of international human rights, 8 8 the U.S. government rejected the decision and
refused to take any steps in accordance with it.8 9 The Danns had no formal avenues for recourse, as the Commission lacks the ability to enforce
the judgment directly and the Inter-American Court on Human Rights
90
The Danns thus redoes not have jurisdiction over the United States.
mained trapped within U.S. governmental spaces despite international
recognition of their plight. As if to reinforce that enclosure, soon after
the Commission's decision, the U.S. government came to the land inhabited by these two grandmothers with forty armed agents, ATVs and a helicopter in order to seize 227 heads of cattle from them. 91
83. See United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 40 (1985).
84. See United States v. Dann, 873 F.2d 1189, 1200 (9th Cir. 1989).
85. See Notes from University of Idaho College of Law, International Law Symposium, Indigenous Peoples and International Human Rights Law: Lands, Liberties, and Legacies (Coeur d'Alene, ID 2006) [hereinafter Notes] (on file with
author).
86. In 1999, the Danns withdrew their claim of individual aboriginal title to
avoid conflict with their tribal claim. See PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA TO THE U.N. COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL

29 (2007), available at http://www.
FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, Annex II,
wsdp.org/US.PeriodicReport_4-07.pdf and http://www.wsdp.org/Annex IIto
USPeriodicReport_4-07.pdf.
87. See Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights arts. 1820, Oct. 31, 1979, O.A.S. G.A. Res. 447 (IX-0/79), available at http://www.iachr.
org/Basicos/English/Basicl 7.Statute%20of% 20the%2OCommission.htm; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the
Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), available at http://
www.iachr.org/Basicos/English/Basic2.American%20Declaration.htm.
88. Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 113/Report No. 75/
02, OEA/Ser.L/ V/II.117 (2001).
89. See Observations, supra note 39.
90. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human
Rights arts. 2-3, 41-51, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, available at http://www.iachr.org/Basicos/basic3.htm, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser. L.V/I.4 Rev. 9
(2003).
91. See Ragsdale, supra note 28, at 196.
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Despite the U.S. rejection of the Commission's decision, international
advocacy efforts continued. The Western Shoshone National Council,
Timbisha Shoshone Tribe, Winnemucca Indian Colony and Yomba Shoshone Tribe brought a petition under the Early Warning and Urgent Action Procedure of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) regarding the U.S. government's
denial of traditional status and recent measures to occupy and use these
lands.9 2 Because the United States ratified CERD in 1994, 9 3 its government has an obligation to comply with requests from the Committee for
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 9 4 After inviting and failing to
receive a timely United States response, the Committee urged the United
States to take the above-mentioned interim measures and then reiterated
its recommendations in its concluding observations. 95 Although this petition represents an interesting framing-within U.S. domestic jurisprudence, Indian Law claims revolve around sovereignty rather than raceand the U.S. has clear obligations, the Committee's intervention has yet to
reconstitute the domestic legal spaces for the Western Shoshone to protect their land. The U.S. response to the Committee's recommendations,
which the Committee "strongly regrets," indicates a continuation of the
96
status quo.
3.

Time

Throughout these bounded legal spaces, problems of time abound.
Historical treaties between sovereigns with unequal bargaining power are
interpreted through the dominant sovereign's legal system to limit the
Danns' present options. 9 7 The compensation that the U.S. government
deposited with its Treasury Department to pay the Danns was at 1872 dollar values rather than present value rates. 9 8 Moreover, these decisions
provide the Danns with the possibility of pursuing individual aboriginal
rights claims based on their usage and that of their lineal ancestors at the
time that the land became part of the grazing district, but not to aboriginal title claims based on their tribal membership. 99 Their attempt to in92. Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 68th Sess., Early
Warning and Urgent Action Procedure, Decision 1(68),
1, 4, United States of
America (Geneva, Feb. 20-Mar. 10, 2006).
93. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights,
Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, June
9, 2004, http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
94. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 9(1),July 3, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 9464, art. 9.
95. See Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Res. 68/1,
supra note 40, 7,; CERD Concluding Observations, supra note 43, 1 19.
96. CERD Concluding Observations, supra note 43,
19. Accord supra note
42.
97. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
98. See W. Shoshone Identifiable Group v. United States, 35 Ind. Cl. Comm.
457, 468 (1975).
99. United States v. Dann, 873 F. 2d 1189, 1199 (9th Cir. 1987).
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tervene with the ICC and the Te-Moak Tribe's reversal were both deemed
untimely, 10 0 and the United States declined to give a timely response to
10 1
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.
These dilemmas pale in the face of the time problem underlying this
dispute: the uncertain fate of the future generations. If the government
can take the Danns' cattle and horses because it treats their herding as
trespass, how will the next generation continue traditional ways of life?
How can their progeny maintain traditional hunting practices if killing
deer through these methods results in criminal charges? The Danns' fight
is not simply about their own land, but about the legal barriers to their
10 2
cultural and spiritual traditions moving forward through time.
Although the Danns' situation provides an individual legal maze, it is
also emblematic of the myriad of barriers facing indigenous peoples in the
United States that make continuation of their traditional ways of life increasingly difficult. For example, the environmental impacts of climate
change in the Arctic pose significant challenges to the Inuit, who filed a
petition in the Inter-American Commission claiming that U.S. climate
change policy violates their rights. 10 3 Given the rapid timeframe of devastating climate change in the Arctic and the current pace of greenhouse
gas emissions, the options open to address this problem through available
legal spaces are limited. 10 4 Moreover, the Inter-American Commission
chose not to make recommendations based on the specific claims in the
petition, but instead held a more general hearing on climate change and
05

human rights.1

100. See W Shoshone Identifiable Group, 35 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 463.
101. Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 68th Sess., Early
Warning and Urgent Action Procedure, Decision 1(68),
2-3, United States of
America (Geneva, Feb. 20-Mar. 10, 2006).
102. See Notes, supra note 85.
103. See Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and
Omissions of the United States (submitted Dec. 7, 2005), at 75-95, available at
http://www.earthjustice.org/library/legal-docs/petition-to-the-inter-americancommission-on-human-rights-on-behalf-of-the-inuit-circumpolar-conference.pdf;
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted
by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), available at
http://www.iachr.org/Basicos/English/Basic2.American%2ODeclaration.htm.
104. See Susan Joy Hassol, Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, IMPACTS OF A
WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 8 (2004), available at http://
www.amap.no/acia/index.html [hereinafter "ACIA"]. As Sheila Watt-Cloutier,
then-Chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, stated after filing the petition:
"How would you respond if an international assessment prepared by more than
300 scientists from 15 countries concluded that your age-old culture and economy
was doomed, and that you were to become a footnote to globalization?" Presentation by Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Chair, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Eleventh Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Montreal,
Dec. 7, 2005, available at http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/index.php?ID=318&

Lang=En.
105. See Letter from Ariel E. Dulitzky, Assistant Executive Secretary, Org. of
Am. States, to Paul Crowley, Legal Representative for Sheila Watt-Cloutier et al.
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The conflict that began with colonization and officially ended
through treaties between sovereigns continues into the future through disputes like that of the Danns. Without spaces that allow for thoughtful reengagement of fairness over time, the Danns face an ongoing reconfiguration of the legal wormholes through which the original colonization deprived their ancestors of land.
B.

Padilla'sDays in Courts

Jos6 Padilla's justice wormhole has many similarities to that of the
Danns despite its very different substantive legal context. Namely, like
other individuals designated as "enemy combatants," he has been caught
in the intersection of the War on Terror with criminal law and procedure. 10 6 Appendix Two provides a chronology of his movement between
the criminal justice system and the "enemy combatant" status.
(Nov. 16, 2006), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/science/16commissionletter.pdf (regarding Petition No. P-1413-05); Letter from
Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Martin Wagner and Daniel Magraw to Santiago Cant6n, Executive Secretary, Inter-Am. Comm'n on Human Rights (Jan. 15, 2007) (on file
with author); Letter from the Org. of Am. States to Sheila Watt-Cloutier et al. (Feb.
1, 2007) (on file with author) (regarding Petition No. P-1413-05). I have discussed
this case in depth elsewhere. See Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation as PluralistLegal Dialogue?, 43A STAN..J. INT'L L. 181 (2007); Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation: Implicationsfor TransnationalRegulatory Governance,
83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1789 (2005); Hari M. Osofsky, The Inuit Petition as a Bridge?:
Beyond Dialectics of Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples' Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN L.
REv. 675 (2007).

106. For scholarly analysis of the Padillacase and other "enemy combatant"
cases, see Diane Marie Amann, Guantdnamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263
(2004); Charles S. Doskow, Jose Padillaand the Due Process of Law, 19 ST. THOMAS L.
REv. 199 (2006) (providing chronology of case and these developments); Mark A.
Drumbl, The Expressive Value of Prosecutingand Punishing Terrorists:Hamdan, the Geneva Conventions, and InternationalCriminal Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. Rv. 1165, 1169
(2007) (providing an interesting analysis of "triangulation among the Hamdan ruling, international criminal law, and the Geneva Conventions"); Jonathan L.
Hafetz, The Supreme Court's "Enemy Combatant"Decisions:Recognizing the Rights of NonCitizens and the Rule of Law, 14 TEMPLE POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 409, 411 (2005);

Carlton F.W. Larson, The Forgotten ConstitutionalLaw of Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 863 (2006);Jenny S. Martinez,JosgPadillaand the
War on Rights, 80 VA. Q. REV. 56, 56 (2004); Ellen S. Podgor,Jose Padillaand Martha
Stewart: Who Should Be Charged with Criminal Conduct?, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1059,
1067-68 (2005); RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., The "Enemy Combatant" Cases in Historical Context: The Inevitability of PragmaticJudicialReview, 82 NOTRE DAME L.REV. 1005, 105354 (2007); Tung Yin, ProceduralDue Process to Determine "Enemy Combatant" Status in
the War on Terrorism, 73 TENN. L. REv. 351, 352 (2006);John Yoo, Courts at War, 91
CORNELL L. REv. 573, 579-82 (2006); John Yoo, National Security and the Rehnquist
Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1144, 1147-48 (2006); Michelle Maslowski, Note, Classification of Enemy Combatants and the Usurpation of Judicial Power by the Executive
Branch, 40 IND. L. REv. 177 (2007); Monica Melchionni, Note, Confining the Constitution: What the Detainment ofJose PadillaMeans to the American People and How Detention Proceduresfor U.S. Citizens Should Be Amended to Include Protections Similarto Those
Imbedded in the Civil Commitment System, 25 QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 251 (2006);
Samantha A. Pitts-Kiefer, Note, Jose Padilla:Enemy Combatant or Common Criminal?,
48 VILL. L. REv. 875 (2003).
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Padilla has spent the last five years in detention, generally with limited
access to his attorneys. He was detained in May 2002 in Chicago on a
material witness warrant 10 7 and then was moved into federal criminal custody in New York. 10 8 After classifying him as an "enemy combatant" a
month later, the government moved him to the Consolidated Naval Brig
in Charleston, South Carolina. 10 9 In 2005, a federal grand jury indicted
Padilla, which resulted in his early 2006 transfer to Florida-and the criminal justice system-to face trial. The trial resulted in a unanimous conviction and Padilla was sentenced on January 22, 2008, to an additional
seventeen years and four months in prison. 110 Since Padilla's initial detention, three district courts,"' three circuit courts,"12 and the Supreme
Court have addressed aspects of his case multiple times, 113 with no substantive resolution of whether his several-year "enemy combatant" designation was appropriate." 4 U.S. District CourtJudge Marcia Cooke's taking
Padilla's "harsh" detention conditions into account when she shortened
his sentence from the government's recommended thirty years to life term
represents the most significant instance of his receiving improved treat5
ment as a result of his ordeal."1
The case against him similarly has varied over time. Initially, the federal Executive Branch refused to describe the charges on national security
grounds. Then, on June 1, 2004, as the Supreme Court deliberated for
the first time regarding his case, officials held a press conference to de107. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004).
108. See id. at 431.
109. See id. at 431-32.
110. See Hanft v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 1084 (2006); Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062
(2006); United States v. Padilla, No. 04-60001-CR, 2007 WL 1079090, at *1 (S.D.
Fla. Apr. 9, 2007); Verdict, United States v. Padilla, No. 04-60001, 2007 WL
2349148 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2007); Padilla Given Long Jail Sentence, BBC NEws, Jan.
23, 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7203276.stm; Department of Justice, Press Release, Jose Padilla and Co-defendants Sentenced on Terrorism
Charges,Jan. 22, 2008, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/January/
08_nsd_046.html.
111. See United States v. Padilla, No. 04-CR-60001 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2006);
Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678 (D.S.C. 2005); Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush,
233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 569-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
112. See United States v. Hassoun, 476 F.3d 1181, 1184-85 (11th Cir. 2007);
Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 397 (4th Cir. 2005); Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d
695, 724 (2d Cir. 2003).
113. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 715 (2004), cert. denied, Padilla v.
Hanft, 545 U.S. 1123, 1123 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1062, 1062 (2006).
114. See infra Appendix 2.
115. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Lowers PadillaSentence Because Harsh Confinement, ABA JouRNAL, Jan. 22, 2008, available at http://www.abajournal.com/
news/judge-lowers-padilla-sentence because-of harsh-confinement/; Carol J.
Williams, Padilla Gets Unexpected Sentence, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 23, 2008, available at
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-padilla23jan23,0,7017231.story; Padilla Given Long Jail Sentence, supra note 110.
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scribe the claims against him.1 16 Finally, in the criminal indictment announced on November 22, 2005, as the Supreme Court considered
Padilla's third certiorari petition, the case against him was made on completely different grounds, upon which he was convicted on August 16,
2007.117

Judge Luttig's response to this final move helps to describe the shifting contours of the wormhole:
For, as the government surely must understand, although
the various facts it has asserted are not necessarily inconsistent or
without basis, its actions have left not only the impression that
Padilla may have been held for these years, even if justifiably, by
mistake-an impression we would have thought the government
could ill afford to leave extant. They have left the impression that
the government may even have come to the belief that the principle in reliance upon which it has detained Padilla for this time,
that the President possesses the authority to detain enemy combatants who enter into this country for the purpose of attacking
America and its citizens from within, can, in the end, yield to
expediency with little or no cost to its conduct of the war against
terror-an impression we would have thought the government
likewise could ill afford to leave extant. And these impressions
have been left, we fear, at what may ultimately prove to be substantial cost to the government's credibility before the courts, to
whom it will one day need to argue again in support of a principle of assertedly like importance and necessity to the one that it
seems to abandon today. While there could be an objective that
could command such a price as all of this, it is difficult to imag11 8
ine what that objective would be.
This Section traces the geography of this journey-captured so well
by Judge Luttig, whose preceding substantive opinion was sympathetic to
the Bush Administration's approach-and its implications for the structure of criminal justice.'

19

In particular, this Section uses the vectors of

space, place and time to explore Jos6 Padilla's troubling journey through
the U.S. legal system.

116. See James Comey, Deputy Att'y Gen., Remarks Regarding Jose Padilla
(June 1, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2004/
dag6104.htm.
117. See Verdict, United States v. Padilla, No. 04-60001, 2007 WL 2349148
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2007); see also Comey, supra note 116 (describing claims against

Padilla); Doskow, supra note 106 (providing chronology of case and these
developments).
118. Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 587 (4th Cir. 2005).
119. See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 389 (4th Cir. 2005).
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008
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Place

As with the Dann case, ties to place have played a material role in
Padilla's journey through the U.S. legal system. Padilla has been moved
quite literally from place to place, and government attorneys have used
that movement to evade judicial review. When Padilla was transferred
from criminal custody in New York to a Navy brig in South Carolina, his
attorney learned of his new location through the media.1 20 The U.S. Supreme Court used that relocation as a basis for holding that the district
court in New York lacked jurisdiction and for therefore requiring Padilla
to refile his habeas claim in South Carolina. 21 Filing in the "wrong place"
became a mechanism for continuing detention with no review of whether
he deserved to be labeled an "enemy combatant."
The second shift back into the criminal justice system-in which he
was convicted despite fairness concerns about the impact of his treatment
in detention and his former designation as an enemy combatantchanged his location once again, this time to Florida.' 2 2 Judge Luttig, in
the same opinion quoted above, suggested that the government's actions
provided "at least an appearance that the government may be attempting
to avoid consideration of our decision by the Supreme Court." 12 3 Despite
Judge Luttig's protestation about the "enemy combatant" claims being relinquished without resolution, the Supreme Court declined to review the
appropriateness of that designation yet again.' 2 4 Just as the first transfer
between places constituted a justice wormhole, the second one prevented
a resolution of its appropriate contours.
Ties to place undergirded the substantive legal debate as well. Padilla's citizenship connections to and arrest within the physical boundaries
of the United States have played an important role in his case. Those
linkages have served as grounds for his attorneys to argue for his right to
basic procedural protections and have been an important part of how
courts have framed his habeas claim. For example, in her dissent from the
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari regarding Padilla's "enemy combatant" status following his transfer to Florida, Justice Ginsburg stated:
Does the President have authority to imprison indefinitely a
United States citizen arrested on United States soil distant from a
zone of combat, based on an Executive declaration that the citizen was, at the time of his arrest, an "enemy combatant"? It is a
120. See Martinez, supra note 106, at 58-59.
121. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 441, 447 (2004).
122. See Verdict, United States v. Padilla, No. 04-60001, 2007 WL 2349148
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2007). For further discussion of the fairness concerns regarding
Padilla's treatment and enemy combatant designation, see Interview by Juan Gonzalez and Amy Goodman with Dr. Angela Hegarty, Assistant Professor of Clinical
Psychiatry, Columbia Univ. (Aug. 16, 2007) (transcript available at www. Democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=07/08/1 6/ 1416242#transcript).
123. Padilla, 432 F.3d at 583.
124. See Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006) (order denying certiorari).
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question the Court heard, and should have decided, two years
1 25

ago.

Although the impact of Padilla's territoriality and nationality ties to the
United States was never resolved judicially because of that denial of the
writ, those ties have helped to shape the controversy that his case has engendered and the portrayals of its broader civil liberties implications. His
case leaves open the possibility that he or other citizens could be pulled
out of the criminal justice system with very little meaningful due process
protection. That unresolved issue raises a fundamental question about
what it means to be "safe" as a U.S. citizen in the post-9-11 environment: is
1 26
it safety from terrorists or from arbitrary detention by the government?
As a factual matter, Padilla's citizenship played a critical role in the
U.S. government's ability to track and ultimately arrest him. Padilla visited
the Pakistani embassy in February 2002 to request a new passport, claiming that he had lost his; in so doing, he helped to trigger the U.S. authorities' interest in him. 12 7 His citizenship ties to the United States made that
request necessary to legal travel-most critically, the passport allowed for
his reentry into this country-but he had to obtain the documentation of
citizenship in Pakistan, which made the request more noticeable. Similarly, at least in part because he was a citizen, U.S. authorities did not
refuse him entry to the country, but rather detained him upon arrival to
Chicago. 128 His citizenship status, in that sense, quite literally began his
journey through U.S. detention and courts.
Moreover, the legal determinations of his status interacted in complex ways with his citizenship. On the same day that the Supreme Court
clarified the due process protections for citizen-detainees in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 12 9 it declined to reach the merits of Padilla's case and instead dismissed it on procedural grounds.1 30 When the Fourth Circuit considered
125. Id. at 1064 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
126. For a thoughtful analysis of the way in which Padilla and other post-9-11
War on Terror cases have changed category of citizenship, see Juliet Stumpf, Citizens of an Enemy Land: Enemy Combatants, Aliens, and the ConstitutionalRights of the
Psuedo-Citizen, 38 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 79, 86-87 (2004); see also Saad Gul, Return of the
Native? An Assessment of the Citizenship Renunciation Clause in Hamdi's Settlement Agreement in the Light of CitizenshipJurisprudence,27 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 131 (2007); Rory T.
Hood, Guantanamo and Citizenship: An Unjust Ticket Home?, 37 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L
L. 555 (2006); Kevin R. Johnson, The Forgotten "Repatriation"of Persons of Mexican
Ancestry and Lessons for the "War on Terror,"26 PACE L. REv. 1 (2005); Natsu Taylor
Saito, Border Constructions:Immigration Enforcement and TerritorialPresumptions, 10 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 193 (2007); Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and the Loss of Citizenship Through Marriage,53 UCLA L. REv. 405 (2005).
127. See Comey, supra note 116.
128. Cf Stumpf, supra note 106 (discussing contours of Padilla's citizenship
status). For a discussion of legal spatiality in the context of Guantanamo detainees, see Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2501, 2504

(2005).
129. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
130. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla,

542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004).
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the implications ofJustice O'Connor's opinion in Hamdi for Padilla, it relied upon the Supreme Court ruling to reject Padilla's claims regarding
his detention, but not to consider the due process protections he deserved
as a citizen. 13 ' Due process merits a brief mention in a footnote 13 2 before
the opinion goes on to hold that Padilla's detention, like Hamdi's, is authorized by The Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution. 133 The citizenship that, after Hamdi, should have limited Padilla's
wormhole and the time-space in which it deposited him provided little
basis for relief.' 3 4 Although Hamdi arguably helped to put pressure on the
Executive Branch that ultimately led to Padilla's recategorization, the legal
system's failure to rely directly upon it to provide him with additional due
process protection reinforces the peculiar quality of Padilla's
135
wormhole.
Beyond these formal legal contexts, Padilla's sociocultural connections to place have impacted the public understanding of his case. Consider, for example, the question of what he should be called. Although
this Article references him asJos6 Padilla-the surname he was born with
and the one most commonly used to reference him in the popular press
and academic literature-he renamed himself Abdullah al-Muhajir while
in prison in the 1990s. While the former name connects him to his Roman Catholic Puerto Rican origins, the latter one indicates his conversion
to Islam while in Florida, a conversion that motivated his travels to Egypt,
Afghanistan and Pakistan. 136 Moreover, each of those idenities are themselves multilayered. For example, the complex relationship between the
137
United States and Puerto Rico interacts with culture and identity issues.
The name question did not end with the dilemma of which one to
choose. The issue of how to pronounce his birth surname, Padilla, also
has been the subject of much controversy. Although that name is of Spanish-language origin, the public pronunciation of his name has vacillated
between a Spanish and an anglicized one, Pa-dill(like the pickle)-uh.
Since NPR'sJanuary 2007 decision to use the Spanish pronunciation, that
131.
132.
133.
134.
225-28.
135.

See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 391 (4th Cir. 2005).
See id. at 391 n.2.
See id. at 391-92.
For a discussion of these concerns, see Doskow, supra note 106, at 214-16,
For such an argument, see David A. Martin, JudicialReview and the MiliINT'L L. 344, 348-49

tary Commissions Act: On Striking the Right Balance, 101 AM. J.

(2007).
136. See Amanda Ripley, The Case of the Dirty Bomber, TIME,June 16, 2002, avail-

able at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,262917,00.html.
137. See, e.g.,
PEDRO A. MALAVET, AMERICAN'S COLONY- THE POLITICAL AND
CULTURAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PUERTO RICO (2004) (ex-

ploring implications of legal status of Puerto Rico for treatment of Puerto Ricans);
Angel R. Oquendo, Liking to be in America: Puerto Rico's Quest for Difference in the
United States, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 249 (2004) (exploring "the extent to
which Puerto Rican cultural sovereignty is compatible with the U.S. constitutional
framework").
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one has been favored in public commentary. 1 38 Numerous web postings
display public reaction, both positive and negative, to that pronunciation
decision. Many of them express opinions about how Padilla relates to his
ethnic heritage. 139 These questions of name and pronunciation thus help
to determine where his public identity is located and, as a result, how people respond to it. In the process, this issue of no direct legal relevance to
the case has become part of how people react to Padilla and his plight.
As with the Danncase, these ties to place open up issues of space. As a
legal matter, questions arise about the contours of the space that Padilla
inhabits. Is he entitled to some of the due process protections that the
criminal justice system, based on the U.S. Constitution, provides? If so,
what role does his citizenship play in that entitlement? More broadly, in
both the legal and socio-cultural discourse, considerations of insider and
outsider status abound. Do his various ties to place make him "one of us"
or "other"? To what extent do "others" inhabit a different space in the
U.S. legal system? The next Section, on space, takes up these dilemmas.
2.

Space

The legal space that most fundamentally shaped Padilla's journey
through the U.S. legal system is the category "enemy combatant." As discussed extensively in the case briefing, opinions and scholarly literature,
that designation was not created from the statutory and executive response to 9-11.140 Rather, the Executive Branch has relied upon the use

of the term in a Supreme Court decision during World War II, Ex parte
Quirin.14 1 The case involved several German citizens, and one person
whose United States versus German citizenship status was ambiguous, who
entered the United States during World War II carrying explosives. The
government contended that "because they are enemy aliens or have entered our territory as enemy belligerents," they "must be denied access to
1 42
the courts."
138. See Andy Bowers, Does Not Rhyme with "Tortilla": HowJose PadillaPronounces
His Name, StATE, Nov. 22, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2130925/; CNN Live Today: Criminal Indictment Announced Against Jose Padilla (CNN television broadcast

Nov. 22, 2005) (transcript available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0511/22/lt.03.html); Kee Malesky & Alex Chadwick, A Change in NPR
Pronunciation for Padilla, Jan. 5, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=6729347.
139. See, e.g., Postings to AFF's Brainwash: Jose Padilla's Rights, http://www.
affbrainwash.com/genehealy/archives/020627.php (Jan. 6, 2006); Joe Loya, Alleged Dirty Bomber' and I Would Have Been Prison Buddies, NEw AM.

MEDIA,

June 12,

2002, http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view-article.html?article_id=531;
Postings to Topix: Opening Statements to be Heard Today in Jose Padilla Terror
Trial, http://www.topix.net/forum/news/terrorism/TTDU6QAE45LSQOQ90
(May 14, 2007); Postings to Unfogged: Comment on Pendant News, http://www.
unfogged.com/archives/comments_4303.html (Nov. 22-23, 2005).
140. For analyses of "enemy combatant" cases, see supra note 106.
141. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
142. Id. at 24.
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008
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The Court in Ex parte Quiin, however, chose not to go that far. The
opinion explains that:
neither the Proclamation nor the fact that they are enemy aliens
forecloses consideration by the courts of petitioners' contentions
that the Constitution and laws of the United States constitutionally enacted forbid their trial by military commission. As announced in our per curiam opinion we have resolved those
questions by our conclusion that the Commission has jurisdiction
to try the charge preferred against petitioners. There is therefore
no occasion to decide contentions of the parties unrelated to this
1 43

issue.

Moreover, it narrowly holds that the specific facts of that context, many of
which differ from Padilla's situation, make trial by military commission
acceptable. 144
Most relevant to the legal dialogue over Padilla, the Court describes
an "enemy combatant" as follows:
By universal agreement and practice the law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful populations
of belligerent nations and also between those who are lawful and
unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are subject to capture
and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces.
Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by
military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful. The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military
lines of a belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military
information and communicate it to the enemy, or an enemy
combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines
for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property,
are familiar examples of belligerents who are generally deemed
not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by
military tribunals.

1 45

"Enemy combatant" thus appears to be a sub-category of unlawful combatant, which moves the people involved from the legal space of "prisoners of
war" to one of "offenders against the law of war." This status delineation
provides the basis for the appropriateness of a hearing by military
tribunal.

146

143. Id. at 25.
144. See id. at 46-48.
145. Id. at 30-31.
146. For further discussion of "enemy combatant" designation, see supranote
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As Padilla's lawyers have argued repeatedly, there are a number of
reasons why the facts of his case should fall outside of the space delineated
in Ex parte Quiin.14 7 Most significantly, the Non-Detention Act prevents
citizens from being detained without an Act of Congress.' 48 The statute
upon which the Executive Branch relied to meet that requirement, the
Authorization for Use of Military Force, has been found by the Court to do
so in the context of overseas battlefields. 149 The Court has said nothing,
however, to indicate that the statute provides sufficient grounds for deten150
tion of U.S. citizens obtained in a domestic, civilian context.
The focus of this Section's analysis is not simply to reargue the merits
of Padilla's case, but rather to attempt to capture the contours of the justice wormhole that was created. The biggest problem from a justice perspective is not simply the invocation of the "enemy combatant" category
with respect to Padilla-many have argued that 9-11 shifted sufficiently the
balance between liberty and security to make such a category defensible
with sufficient congressional authorization 1l -but rather that the legal
system gave him no space to resolve the appropriateness of such a designation. The Supreme Court declined to engage the merits of his case on
three different occasions1 5 2 despite a clear split between the Second
and Fourth Circuits by Padilla's final certiorari petition and despite
O'Connor's opinion in Hamdi.153 In so doing, the Court left open the
possibility that Padilla, or any other citizen, might suddenly be put again
into indefinite detention with no clear mechanism for contesting the
15 4
claims against him or her.
3.

Time

As with the Danns, Padilla's travails involved not only a problematic
creation of legal space, but a warping of the way in which time ordinarily
operates in the legal system. In the most basic material sense, the U.S.
government detained Padilla from May 8, 2002, until November 22, 2005,
without criminal charges or a hearing. Moreover, the government has not
closed the door on reinstating that legal limbo at a later point. Detaining
147. See Brief of Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari at 17-18, Padilla v. Hanft, No.
05-533, 2005 WL 2822914 (Oct. 25, 2005).
148. See id. at 18.
149. See id. at 17.
150. See id. at 18.

151. The proper balance between civil liberties and security has been hotly
contested in the post-9-11 context. Compare, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, CongressionalAuthorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2047,
2054 (2005), with David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953, 957 (2002).
152. See Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006); Padilla v. Hanft, 545 U.S. 1123

(2005); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
153. See Brief of Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Padilla v. Hanft, No. 05533, 2005 WL 2822914 (Oct. 25, 2005).
154. For further analysis of this issue, see supra note 106.
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a citizen for that length of time in that fashion, with the possibility of a
1 55
repeat performance, flies in the face of U.S. constitutional protections.
Although such a detention, alone, flouts the spaces for procedural
protection provided in the U.S. legal system, a bigger time problem underlies Padilla's story. The Executive Branch consistently asserted that it
could use the category of "enemy combatant" to detain Padilla indefinitely.1 5 6 That designation becomes not only a space in which the accused
may not be entitled to a hearing, but also one that has no apparent
15 7
end.
The system of checks and balances ostensibly would protect against
such a warping of how our legal system treats time. The judicial branch
had multiple opportunities to close off the wormhole transporting Padilla
into "enemy combatant" status, and both the Second Circuit and District
of South Carolina attempted to do so. 1 58 But the U.S. Supreme Court's
final denial of Padilla's writ of certiorari left that issue unresolved. 159 Congress has not yet promulgated a new statute that clarifies exactly when and
for how long "enemy combatant" status can be invoked.1 60 By their fail155. For a discussion of time and history in the "enemy combatant" context,
see Mitchell Gordon, Adjusting the Rear-View Mirror: Rethinking the Use of History in
Supreme CourtJurisprudence,89 MARQ. L. lkv. 475 (2006); cf. supra note 106 (analyz-

ing "enemy combatant" designation).
156.

ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF

N.Y.,

COMM. ON FED. COURTS, THE

INDEFINITE DETENTION OF "ENEMY COMBATANTS": BALANCING DUE PROCESS AND NA-

TIONAL SECURITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WAR ON TERROR

(2004), availableat http:/

/www.abcny.org/pdf/1C_WL06!.pdf.
157. Justice Ginsburg expressed this concern in her dissent from denial of

certiorari. See Padilla v. Hanft 547 U.S. 1062 (2006) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
158. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 724 (2d Cir. 2003); Padilla v. Hanft,

389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 692 (D.S.C. 2005).
159. See Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006).
160. For various perspectives on recent legislation regarding detainee treatment and military commissions, see Norman Abrams, Developments in US Anti-Terrorism Law, 4J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1117, 1117-118 (2006);Janet Cooper Alexander,
Jurisdiction-Strippingin the War on Terrorism, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 259 (2006); Edward Babayan, S. 3930/H. R. 6166, Military Commissions Act of 2006, 14 HUM. RTS.
BRIEF 48 (2006); Jay Alan Bauer, Detainees Under Review: Striking the Right Constitu-

tional Balance Between the Executive's War Powers andJudicial Review, 57 ALA. L. REv.
1081, 1085 (2006); Michael C. Dorf, The Orwellian Military Commissions Act of 2006,
5J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 10 (2007); Stephen Ellmann, The "Rule of Law" and the Military
Commission, 51 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 761 (2006/07); George P. Fletcher, Hamdan
Confronts the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 427

(2007) (examining Military Commissions Act of 2006); Arthur H. Garrison,

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Military Commissions, and Acts of Congress: A Summary, 30 AM.
J. TRIAL ADvoc. 339 (2006); Jonathan Hafetz, Torture,JudicialReview, and the Regulation of CustodialInterrogations,62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. Am. L. 433, 436 (2007); Julian
Ku &John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The FunctionalCasefor ForeignAffairs Deference
to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179 (2006); Ari D. MacKinnon,
Counterterrorism and Checks and Balances: The Spanish and American Examples, 82
N.Y.U. L. lkv. 602 (2007); Gu6nadl Mettraux, Comparing the Comparable:2006 Military Commissions v. the ICTY, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 59 (2007); Richard v. Meyer,
When a Rose is not a Rose: Military Commissions v. Courts-Martial,5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
48 (2007); Joseph R. Pope, The Lasting Viability of Rasul in the Wake of the Detainee
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ures to act, the legislative and judicial branches have allowed for the possibility of a new variation of the Padilla case to take place in the future.
That possibility, like in the Dann case, is at the heart of the time problem. For the Danns, the justice wormhole may well foreclose future generations from continuing their way of life on their family's traditional lands.
After Padilla's case, citizens can no longer feel secure that they live under
a legal system with basic civil liberties protections. The problem is not
merely that Padilla was detained too long, but rather that the Executive
Branch asserted that it was not constrained by time with respect to desigcase is the
nated categories of people. The verdict in Padilla's criminal
1 61
first decision on the merits since his initial detention.
Although most of us may rest easy knowing we have not consorted
of
with A-Qaeda, the post-9-11 legal environment is littered with stories 162
people who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.
While some of them have been able to tell their stories, we do not know
how many such people-particularly those without the (diminished) protections of U.S. citizenship-remain detained indefinitely at Guantanamo
and elsewhere, being "made into spaghetti" 163 by the U.S. legal system.
III.

REMAPPING WORMHOLES IN THREE VARIATIONS

The wormholes in these two cases have a core similarity. In both instances, the United States simultaneously asserts its authority as a nationstate to determine the fate of the petitioners and relies upon exceptionalism-with respect to how it categorizes Padilla and the Danns and to how
it handles its own compliance with international norms-to create wormholes that threaten the possibilities for justice. In so doing, the United
States articulates a vision of domestic and international lawmaking
grounded in nation-state authority. 16 4 Although the U.S. government formally recognizes international law and institutions and submits responses
to them, the United States-as a practical matter-acts as though it constitutes an enclosed space. This presumption raises foundational questions
about the space occupied by this nation-state at the center of the accounts.
The nation-state, however, is not simply a "space," but also a "scale";
the "United States" references a specific, national level of governance. Yet
Treatment Act of 2005, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 21 (2006); Carlos Manuel Vizquez, The
Military Commissions Act, the Geneva Conventions, and the Courts: A Critical Guide, 101
AM. J. INT'L L. 73 (2007).

161. See Verdict, United States v. Padilla, No. 04-60001, 2007 WL 2349148
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2007).
162. For examples of these stories, see infra notes 235-237 and accompanying
text.
163. See HAWING, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
164. The treaties underlying the Peace of Westphalia established the nationstate as the primary subject and object of international law. See Peace Treaty Between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and Their Respective
Allies, Preamble, Oct. 24, 1648, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/
westphal.htm (hereinafter Peace Treaty).
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the significance of identifying and functioning at that level is complex. Is
the United States an enclosed space atop a scalar hierarchy based on its
power, or a multi-constituted entity that interacts constantly with many
others in a less-ordered framing? How does the social construction of the
legal entity, the United States, impact its ability to assert these exceptional
spaces? Can an entity made up of and democratically constituted by individuals truly be impenetrable? How do the formal legal mechanisms interact with the informal ones?
Just as the geography literature grapples with the ambiguity of
"space," it also analyzes the meaning of "scale" and how one should envi165
sion the federal level of decisionmaking that dominates these cases.
The key insight of the relevant geographic literature is that "scale," like
"space," emerges from ever-shifting social and cultural terrain. As McMaster and Sheppard summarize,
[a]lthough the relative merits of, and relations among... different perspectives of the construction of scale are still the subject
of lively debate .... there is consensus on the need to move away
from thinking about geographic scales as pregiven dimensions of
1 66
society, to thinking about their social construction.
Moreover, a substantial number of these geography scholars have analyzed
how the nation-state as a scale and as a space fits within the changing structure of transnational governance. 167 For the purposes of understanding
justice wormholes, then, this literature suggests that multiple understandings of the "United States" are possible, each of which might cause a different narration of these two case examples. This discourse provides a set of
conceptual tools for engaging the above questions about how the nationstate should be viewed and about how it interacts with other levels of governance and types of actors in these cases.
What makes the geography literature's analysis of scale helpful, however, is not simply its agreement over the need to treat scale as a social
phenomenon, but also its debates over what should be included in the
category of "scale." A recent interchange among leading geographers
Sally Marston, Neil Brenner, Neil Smith and Mark Purcell is emblematic of
the issues raised. Marston wrote an article in 2000 that criticizes scholar165. For a summary of the different models of scale in the geography literature, see NEIL BRENNER, NEW STATE SPACES: URBAN GOVERNANCE AND THE RESCALING OF STATEHOOD 9 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004).
166. McMaster & Sheppard, supra note 27, at 18-19.
167. See, e.g., BRENNER, supranote 165; Becky Mansfield, Beyond Rescaling:Reintegratingthe 'National'asa Dimension of Scalar Relations, 29 PROGRESS IN HUM. GEOG-

458 (2005); Murphy, supra note 4. Legal scholars grapple with questions of
well. See, e.g., THE FLUID STATE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS (Hilary Charlesworth et al. eds., 2005); Keith Aoki, (IntelRAPHY

evolving sovereignty as

lectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48
L. REv. 1293 (1996).

STAN.
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ship on scale for "ignoring social reproduction and consumption. ' 168
Brenner replied in 2001 by raising a concern about the "the analytical
blunting of the concept of geographical scale as it is applied, often rather
indeterminately, to an expanding range of sociospatial phenomena, relations and processes." 16 9 His piece accuses Marston, among other things,
of "overstretching of the concept of geographical scale"1 70 and argues that
scale analysis should focus only on what he terms "plural" conceptions of
the politics of scale, which focus on interactions among levels rather than
within a level. 171 Marston, together with Smith, replied in 2001.172 Most

notably, for the purposes of this discussion, they criticize Brenner for "the
same slippage between scale and space that he rejects" 173 in his analysis
and of being unreflective in his categorizing of her analysis as not about
scale. 174 Purcell commented on this exchange in 2003 as an example of
what he terms "islands of practice"; he argues that each scholar makes
important points, but fails to engage with the other's ideas. 175 In 2007,
Marston, together with John Paul Jones III and Keith Woodward, responded to the ongoing debate by writing a controversial piece arguing
1 76
for the abandonment of the idea of scale in favor of a "flat ontology.
These debates are emblematic of the contribution that the geography
literature can make to legal analysis of scalar issues. Namely, this literature
asks basic questions, often underexplored in the legal discourse, about
what we should be including when we delineate a scale or describe multiscalar dynamics. It provides the basis for exploring more deeply the extent
177
to which the levels of governance that law delineates are fixed or fluid.
168. Sallie A. Marston, The Social Construction of Scale, 24 PROGRESS
219, 219 (2000).

IN HUM.

GEOGRAPHY

169. Neil Brenner, The Limits to Scale? MethodologicalReflections on ScalarStruc-

turation, 25

PROGRESS IN HUM. GEOGRAPHY

591, 592 (2001).

170. Id. at 598.
171. Id. at 600-01.
172. Sallie A. Marston & Neil Smith, States, Scales and Households: Limits to Scale
Thinking? A Response to Brenner, 25 PROGRESS IN HUM. GEOGRAPHY 615, 616 (2001).

173. See id.
174. Id. at 617-18.
175. Mark Purcell, Islands of Practiceand the Marston/BrennerDebate: Towards a
More Synthetic Critical Human Geography, 27 PROGRESS IN HUM. GEOGRAPHY 317

(2003).
176. Sallie A. Marston,John Paul Jones III & Keith Woodward, Human Geography Without Scale, 30 TRANSACrIONS Or THE INST. OF BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 416 (2005).

177. For discussion of issues of fixity and fluidity in the geography literature,
see Andrew Herod, Scale: The Local and the Global, in KEY CONCEPTS IN GEOGRAPHY

229, 234-42 (Sarah L. Holloway, Stephen P. Rice & Gill Valentine eds., 2003); Erik
Swyngedouw, Excluding the Other: The Production of Scale and Scaled Politics, in GEOGRAPHIES OF ECONOMIES 167, 169 (Roger Lee & Jane Wills eds., 1997); Erik

Swyngedouw, Neither Global nor Local: "Globalization" and the Politics of Scale, in
SPACES OF GLOBALIZATION: REASSERTING THE POWER OF THE LOCAL 137, 141 (Kevin

R. Cox ed., 1997); Neil Brenner, Between Fixity and Motion: Accumulation, Territorial
Organization and the Historical Geography of Spatial Scales, 16 ENV'T AND PLAN. D:
SoC'Y AND SPACE 459, 461 (1998); Kevin R. Cox, Spaces

of Dependence, Spaces of En-

gagement and the Politicsof Scale, Or: Looking for Local Politics, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 1,
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This scholarship also assists with an analysis of how the territorial extent of
a legal entity does and should compare to the scale of the problems that it
considers. 178 Most critical for an analysis ofjustice wormholes and of how
one might reconstitute them, it considers the nature of the rescaling
processes that take place in the creation, implementation and interpreta179
tion of law.
For the purposes of this Article's inquiry, the often contentious discourse over basic definitional questions raises core issues about how we
should describe the United States in the Dann and Padilla cases. First,
what should an analysis of United States' behavior include? How does its
formal legal construction of these wormholes interact with socio-cultural
understandings of the nation-state's role? Second, and related to this first
set of questions, how should we intertwine understandings of the nationstate as a space and as a scale? To what extent does our understanding of
the cases and possibilities for reconstructing them vary based on the way in
which we model the United States?
Such questions are not merely theoretical semantics. Consider, for
instance, the United States' decision in the Dann case to tell the Committee on the Elimination on Racial Discrimination, to which it has binding
treaty-based commitments, that the issues raised before it are not appropriate for its consideration. 180 In one narrative, the United States is flouting its relative power to reject international-level decisionmaking. In
another, the United States is protecting its territorial sovereignty from the
inappropriate incursions of an international body. How does one decide
which story to tell, or whether to narrate this situation entirely differently?
The first set of questions directs us to identify the differences between
the formal and informal story. As a formal matter, one might consider
whether the treaty covers these matters or not, an issue that may be ambiguous. More broadly, the United States' ability to "get away" with this statement, whether or not the treaty allows it, provides insight into its role in
international governance. The second set of questions builds upon the
first by pushing us towards a thicker understanding of the United States as
an actor in this conflict. It is not only operating at a different level of
19-21 (1998); David Delaney & Helga Leitner, The PoliticalConstruction of Scale, 16
POL. GEOGRAPHY 93, 93 (1997); Deborah G. Martin, Transcending the Fixity ofJurisdictionalScale, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 33, 35 (1998); Anssi Paasi, Place and Region: Looking through the Prism of Scale, 28 PROGRESS INHUM. GEOGRAPHY 536, 542-43 (2004).

178. For analyses of issues of extent and resolution, see Robert B. McMaster &
Eric Sheppard, Introduction: Scale and Geographic Inquiy, in SCALE AND GEOGRAPHIC
INQUIRY: NATURE, SOCIETY AND METHOD 1, 5-6 (Eric Sheppard & Robert B. McMaster eds., 2003); Nathan F. Sayre, Ecological and GeographicalScale: Parallelsand Potentialfor Integration, 29 PROGRESS INHUM. GEOGRAPHY 276, 281 (2005); Neil Smith,
Geography, Difference and the Politics of Scale, in PosTMODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENcEs 57, 73-74 (Joe Doherty, Elspeth Graham & Mo Malek eds., 1992).
179. For an example of an in-depth examination of those processes, see BRENNER, supra note 165, at 9-11.
180. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
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governance.than the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, but also attempting to define itself as a distinct sociolegal space. The
United States asserts its ability to say "no" to the Committee by constructing itself as an entity bounded by sovereignty that can create clearly enforceable prescriptions in contrast with the Committee's broader
geographical coverage and nation-state-given authority. What we include
in the analysis may not resolve which narrative is "correct," but it changes
how we consider the conflict.1 81
This Part explores these questions by presenting three different visions of the United States space in the Dann and Padilla cases, each of
which draws from the geography literature on scale. Unlike in some of my
other scholarship, in which the focus has been on what a model of international lawmaking should include and how that affects the narrative, these
visions are not focused on international law per se (although they certainly
interact with it).18

2

Rather, I am trying to map the contours of what con-

stitutes the United States and the implications of that model for remapping the wormholes.
The first section provides a narrative of the United States as an enclosed space and as the primary scale. It considers the contours of such a
space and the possibilities for legal change within it. The next section

then turns to an intermediate model in which the nation-state's enclosure
and primacy are incomplete because of the many ways in which its "borders" are permeable. Finally, the third section explores a more pluralist
alternative in which the nation-state is enmeshed with a range of other
entities and argues that this final move towards legal pluralism opens up
the greatest possibilities for justice.
A.

The Enclosed United States

United
States

181. Although these kinds of questions are explored in various forms in other
interdisciplinary international law analyses, those discussions tend to draw from
political science and sociology. See, e.g., OONA ANNE HATHAWAY & HAROLD HONGJU
KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS (2005); Ryan Goodman &

Derek Jinks, InternationalLaw and State Socialization: Conceptual, Empirical, and Nor-

mative Challenges, 54 DuKE LJ. 983 (2005); Ryan Goodman & DerekJinks, How to

Influence States: Socialization and InternationalHuman Rights Law, 54 DuKE LJ. 621
(2004); Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 CHI. L. REv. 469 (2005). This Article focuses on what the geographic perspective can bring, and a full integration of geography with these other
interdisciplinary approaches is beyond the scope of this paper.
182. See Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation as PluralistLegal Dialogue, supra note
105; Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation Part II: Narrativesof
Massachusetts v. EPA, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 573 (2008).
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In the first variation, the vectors of place, space and time reveal an
enclosed nation-state empowered to mete out its version of justice upon
Padilla and the Danns. Their fate rests upon determinations at a national
level that they have limited ability to influence. Although other seats of
authority-whether tribes or supranational entities-formalistically have
power to dialogue with the nation-state, the United States' responses make
clear that it views itself as controlling the terms of the processes confining
Padilla and the Danns.
This enclosed model focuses on the United States as constituted
through and governed by the Constitution and the laws that flow from it.
To understand the legal space occupied by the United States, one can
examine those documents and determine how they distribute decisionmaking authority. A significant scholarly literature on federalism grapples
with these kinds of questions. 183 In the context of these two cases, an
extensive and controversial U.S. constitutional jurisprudence exists on takings generally,1 8 4 expropriation of Native American land,18 5 the require-

183. Federalism is such a consistent topic in the legal and broader academic
literature that it is impossible to capture even the scholarship of the last couple
years in a brief footnote. An in-depth engagement of federalism is beyond the
scope of this paper. For examples of some interesting recent analyses, see GARRETr Epps, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE FIGHT FOR
RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA (2006); KIMBERLY S. JOHNSON, GOVERNING THE
AMERICAN STATE: CONGRESS AND THE NEW FEDERALISM 1877-1929 (2006); Gary
Marks & Liesbet Hooghe, Contrasting Visions of Multi-level Governance, in MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE 15 (Ian Bache & Matthew Flinders eds., 2004); RUTHERFORD H.
PLATT, LAND-USE AND SOcIETv: GEOGRAPHY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY (2004); EDWARD PURCELL, ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE (forthcoming 2008); ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: How
A FEDERAL SYSTEM PROTECTS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (forthcoming); THE DYNAMICS
OF FEDERALISM IN NATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEMS (Michael A.

Pagano & Robert Leonardo eds., 2007); Robert B. Ahdieh, In Praiseof Mixed Governance: Federalization, Nationalization, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 53 BUFF. L. REv.
721 (2005); FederalismPast,Federalism Future:A ConstitutionalLaw Symposium, 21 ST.
JOHNS J. LEGAL COMMENT. 447 (2007); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption:
How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1
(2007); Dennis R. Judd, The Case of the MissingScales: A Commentary on Cox, 17 POL.
GEOGRAPHY 29, 30-32 (1998); Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the
Age of Regulatory Statute, 92 IowA L. REv. 245 (2007); Modern Federalism Issues and
American Business: Articles and Essays, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 697 (2006); Robert A.
Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism,91 IOWA L. REv. 243 (2005); Editors' Foreword, Symposium: A New Constitutional Order?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 471
(2006); see also MICHAEL BURGESS, COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM (forthcoming 2008); J.
ISAWA ELAIGWU, THE POLITICS OF FEDERALISM IN NIGERIA (2007).

184. For a discussion of that jurisprudence, see supra note 21; see also Carol M.
Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH
L. REv. 1 (2000).
185. For analyses of Supreme Court Indian Law jurisprudence, see FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw (2005 ed.); Gloria Valencia-Weber, The
Supreme Court's Indian Law Decisions: Deviationsfrom ConstitutionalPrinciples and the
Crafting of JudicialSmallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405 (2003).
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ments of criminal due process'
1 87

86

and, increasingly, the category of "enemy

combatant."

The outcomes of the two cases can be explained through a narrative
that envisions an impenetrable nation-state. If the United States was more
permeable, one might expect that the Danns had a better chance than
Padilla did of ultimately escaping into another time-space because they
sought out entities at supranational levels, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination. In contrast, Padilla's case, in a formal sense, took place
entirely within the United States legal system and so he had less external
88
protection from the federal government.'
At this point in time, however, Padilla arguably is obtaining more of
the protections of the legal system than the Danns are,18 9 though fairness
concerns stemming from his "enemy combatant" detention infuse his recent conviction and sentencing. Currently, he is categorized as a convicted criminal serving his sentence rather than as an "enemy combatant"
and, through such a status, receives the panoply of rights articulated
through the United States Constitution, statutes and common law. 190 In
contrast, Carrie Dann, since her sister Mary's death, has continued to battle the U.S. government for her land with no change in its recognition of
her status. Padilla's "success" in escaping, however, as articulated above
has come through an arbitrary re-determination of his status by the federal
government. As a formal matter, the U.S. government is choosing when
people are moved through wormholes.
Even within the confines of the United States, though, one can focus
on strands of the narrative that contain the possibility of greater justice.
As a starting point, the enclosed nation-state is not a monolithic entity
speaking with one voice. Rather, the national-level perspective is being
shaped through an intra-governmental dialogue; the executive, legislative
and judicial branches have complementary and conflicting narratives
about what justice requires, as evidenced by the differing outcomes of the
efforts by petitioners to move into alternative legal spaces. This intersection creates many possible avenues for formal legal change.

186. For an exploration of some of the core themes in the criminal due process literature, see supra notes 8 & 11.
187. For a discussion of the enemy combatant jurisprudence, see supra note
106 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 122.

189. For a discussion of dynamics between national courts and international
tribunals, see Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: InternationalReview of
National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2029 (2004).
190. See Verdict, United States v. Padilla, Case No. 04-60001, available at http:/
/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/uspad8l7O7juryverdict.html;
sources
supra note 115.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008

35

Villanova Law
Review, Vol. 53,
Iss. 1REVIEW
[2008], Art. 4
VILLANOVA
LAW

[Vol. 53: p. 117

Most fundamentally, adult citizens in the United States generally have
the right to vote at multiple levels of government. 19 1 With the 2008 Presidential and Congressional elections, as well as the reconfiguration of Congress through the 2006 mid-term elections, come possibilities to change
the decisionmakers in two branches of government directly and the third
indirectly. One does not even need to look beyond the case examples for
reinforcement that who occupies executive and legislative positions and
the choices that they make have a major impact on the contours of wormholes. The Dann case came close to settling with the Department of the
Interior before the Department ofJustice decided to seek Supreme Court
review, 192 and the Padilla case forms part of the Bush Administration's
19 3
approach to its War on Terror.
Moreover, conflicting decisions within a branch or among branches
may enhance or undermine prospects for justice. Both cases rely upon a
mix of Executive Branch decisions, statutes and judicial precedent. As a
result, any one of those can be used as a lever for bringing more protection against justice wormholes. Despite all that has unfolded in the Dann
case, for example, either Congress or the Executive Branch could still give
them their land back. Similarly, an agency within the Executive Branch
decided to no longer designate Padilla as an enemy combatant, and Congress could amend the statutes at issue in the case.
Remapping wormholes in this enclosed model thus requires determining the points of leverage within the structure of the nation-state and
strategically engaging them. The possibilities for justice rest upon finding
places within the different branches of government where people are amenable to alternative paradigms that change the structure of the big
picture.

191. For a discussion of current issues surrounding legal protection of voting
rights, see Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the
Opt-In Approach, 106 COLUM. L. Rzv. 708 (2006); Richard H. Pildes, The Future of
Voting Rights Policy: From Anti-Discriminationto the Right to Vote, 49 How. L. J. 471
(2006).
192. See O'Connell, supra note 28, at 787-91.
193. See Comey, supra note 116.
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The Permeable United States

The discussion of strategic advocacy at the end of the preceding Section suggests a core difficulty with the enclosed model of the United
States. The federal government does not actually exist in total isolation.
As a starting point, the government is an ever-evolving entity because "it" is
composed of many individuals. Those individuals shape both the space
that it occupies and the scale at which it operates.
GeographerJulie Cidell has explored the many ways in which individuals help to scale institutions. She notes:
In the literature on the politics of scale, the individual has largely
been treated as a separate scale: the site of multiple and conflicting identities, a locus of struggle for political power and control,
or an entry point into the sphere of social reproduction. However, jurisdictions and organizations at higher scales are themselves composed of individuals, and therefore consideration
needs to be made of the role that individuals play within the
politics of scale .... In multi-scalar conflicts . . .individuals as
scales are not politically powerful .... Because individuals are

themselves the sites of multiple scales, they can be torn between
those scalar identities, sometimes expressed as keeping the professional separate from the personal . .

.

. Finally, there is the

question of individuals within scales. The conflation of the identities of individuals with the identities of their jurisdiction is a
194
common practice.
Through the individuals that comprise it, the United States government in
these cases has "multiple and conflicting identities." As people move in
194. Julie Cidell, The Place of Individuals in the Politics of Scale, 38 ARA 196, 202
(2006). As noted previously, related issues have been explored in other disciplines, but not through the particular lens that geography brings. See Brenner,
supra note 177.
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and out of government service and evolve over time, both the wormholes
and the possibilities for addressing them shift.
Beyond this porousness built into the government's composition, the
"United States" is constantly interacting with a range of other entities. Formal and informal interactions help to shape the decisions that are made.
Judith Resnik has explained that the federalist structure actually facilitates
a range of interconnections between governmental and nongovernmental
entities at different levels. 19 5 These interactions allow rights to permeate
the United States legal system even as debates rage over the extent to
which its courts should consider foreign and international sources.19 6
In situations like the Dann and Padilla cases in which the United
States government asserts its power to create wormholes, the possibilities
for formal relief often seem limited. A permeable model of the United
States opens the door to advocacy strategies that can build upon efforts to
deconstruct the federal government to find points of leverage. Such strategies are critical when the formal national legal system asserts itself as an
enclosed space.
Both the internal and external permeability of the United States create opportunities for remapping wormholes. First, the permeable model
allows for a thicker explanation of those points of leverage by recognizing
the individuals that comprise them. Accomplishing policy change comes
at the nexus of recognizing the governmental interests at stake and the
individuals responsible for them. Even such an identification process may
not lead to justice, however, if a key individual makes a decision that undermines advocacy efforts. For example, at a crucial moment in the Dann
case, in which they were negotiating with representatives from the Department of Interior, their attorney,John O'Connell, attempted unsuccessfully
19 7
to persuade the Solicitor General not to seek Supreme Court review.
That certiorari petition ended up disrupting the negotiations and the
Court completed the construction of the wormhole and the troubling
19 8
time-space at the end of it.

Second, this model explains more clearly the effectiveness of informal
advocacy strategies on behalf of either side upon the formal legal process.
For example, when the United States government officials held a press
conference to announce their allegations about Padilla as the Supreme
Court was deliberating, that interaction with the media may have influenced the formal legal process. 199 Similarly, although the United States
195. See Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism'sMultiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006).
196. See, e.g., Agora: The United States Constitution and InternationalLaw, 98 Am.
J. Ir'LL. 42 (2004) (debating the appropriateness of international law being used
in constitutional interpretation); Austen L. Parrish, A Storm in a Teacup: The U.S.
Supreme Court's Use of Foreign Law, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 637 (2007).

197. See O'Connell, supra note 28, at 787-91.
198. See id.
199. See Comey, supra note 116.
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has formally refused to change its behavior in response to the Danns' supranational petitions, those filings have helped to draw public attention to
the case, which may ultimately influence the behavior of the
2
government. 00
The permeable model thus represents an intermediate step towards
pluralism because it treats the United States as a distinct space, but finds
ways of penetrating it. This model thickens the narrative of what the
United States is and how it interacts with individuals and entities to include more than just the formal story. In so doing, this approach reveals
many holes in the seemingly impenetrable nation-state which are missed
in the enclosed model.
C.

The Enmeshed United States

The permeable model, which provides a second variation of a narrative of the United States' role in these cases, raises additional questions
that lead to the third, enmeshed model. Namely, if the dynamics among
the actors in these cases actually involve interwoven formal and informal
interactions, does the permeable model go far enough? Is it accurate to
think of the nation-state as a central entity with other actors penetrating it,
or is the United States so deeply engaged with a range of actors that it
becomes only one dancer in an ensemble performance? A rich literature
in numerous disciplines provides the basis for such a model of the nationstate completely enmeshed with the other actors. This section will meld
two of these theoretical approaches, geographer Kevin Cox's work on
scale and networks and legal pluralism's effort to engage formal and informal hybridity.
Cox argues that scale can be more aptly described by thinking about
networks than through the traditional "areal" approach, which focuses on
specific territory like the United States. He explains:
Networks signify unevenness in the penetration of areal forms.
They are also rarely entirely contained by areal forms; boundaries tend to be porous. The territorial reach of state agencies is
200. See Osofsky, The Inuit Petition as a Bridge?, supra note 105; Sheila Watt-

Cloutier, Chair, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Presentation at Eleventh Conference
of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Montreal (Dec. 7, 2005),

available at http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/index.php?ID=318&Lang=En.
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imperfect. Even in the case of the most totalitarian of states,
there are always spaces of resistance. The same applies to other
agents with territorially defined powers like the utilities, political
parties and labor unions. To be sure, they all enjoy power, in the
sense of rights, with respect to particular bounded areas or enclosures, but it is a formal power which is affected in its actual application by contingent conditions. Conversely, agents, in the
associations that they can form and indeed do form, are by no
means limited by particular enclosures. Local government policies can be appealed to higher levels of authority. Networks of
association are created across national boundaries, as in the fight
20 1
against apartheid.
Seen in these terms, the cases involve a constant push and pull between
formal and informal associational networks. For instance, the appeal to
international tribunals in the Dann case can be seen as an attempt to
"scale up" and involve a network of actors at a larger scale into the dynam20 2
ics of the case.
In such a model, questions about the relationship between formal law
and informal mechanisms emerge. Cox's networks flow between the formal and informal and acknowledge power throughout, a far cry from the
enclosed model with which this Part began. The rich literature in legal
pluralism may help to explain these dynamics further in a legal context.
This scholarship, which originated in and often draws from anthropology,
has long explored a vision of law that encompasses multiple normative
communities-formal and informal-inhabiting shared social space. Although legal pluralist analyses have varied significantly from their origins
in studying colonial societies to the present, they provide a more holistic
version of legal decisionmaking that is less focused on what courts and
208
legislatures mandate.
Most relevant to conceptions of the nation-state, an emerging analysis
of what is termed "global legal pluralism" describes the way in which state
and nonstate actors interact at a range of scales to create simultaneous

201. Kevin R. Cox, Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of
Scale, Or: Looking for Local Politics, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 1 (1998).

202. For a broader discussion of efforts to advocate for indigenous peoples'
rights under international law, see ANAYA, supra note 44.
203. The legal pluralist literature, for example, engages the importance of
addressing the multiple normative communities-formal and informal-that
share social spaces. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term Foreword:
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1983); Ambreena Manji, 'Like a Mask
Dancing':Law and Colonialism in Chinua Achebe's Arrow of God, 27J. LAw & Soc. 626
(2000); Emmanuel Melissaris, The More the Merrier? A New Take on Legal Pluralism,
13 Soc. & L. STUDIES 57 (2004); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism,22 LAw & Soc'Y
REv. 869 (1988); Dalia Tsuk, The New Deal Origins of American Legal Pluralism, 29
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 189 (2001).
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157

binding outcomes. 20 4 This scholarship owes an intellectual debt to, even
as it sometimes moves away from, the New Haven School of international
law. That school, which originated from collaboration between Harold
Lasswell and Myres McDougal, argues that law is "a process of authoritative
decision by which members of a community clarify and secure their common interests." 20 5 It claims that "humankind today lives in a whole hierarchy of interpenetrating communities, from the local to the global,"20 6 and
that authoritative decisionmaking grounded in effective power occurs in
constitutive arenas that bring together a range of actors from those differ20 7
ent communities.
Most leading accounts of how the nation-state should be regarded in
our globalizing world are far more pluralist than the formal Westphalian
model in which consent between sovereign and equal nation-states undergirds an international legal system centered on them. 20 8 But the further
pluralist step of decentering nation-states leaves considerable ambiguity
about how they fit into transnational governance. Consider, for example,
this description by McDougal and two other leading New Haven School
proponents, W. Michael Reisman and Andrew Willard:
Since the emergence of nation states in the wake of feudalism
and the vanished Roman Empire of the West, the politics of
Western Europe have been dominated by the conflicts and accommodations of the nation-state system .... With the rapid

fragmentation of bodies politic that has taken place since World
War II, the nation state, frequently with a scanty resource base,
often more closely resembles the land-poor city state of an earlier
epoch than a large-scale national unit. Nonetheless, the nation
state has come to be viewed as the dominant category of partici20 9
pation in the world community.
Whether or not one moves as far along the pluralist spectrum as the New
Haven School and its progeny, the formal legal understanding of the nation-state must somehow be reconciled with the range of thicker descriptions of its role.
204. See Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism,80 S. CAL. L. REv. 1155
(2007).
205.

HAROLD

D.

LASSWELL & MYRES S. McDoUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE

SOCIETY. STUDIES IN LAw, SCIENCE AND POLICY xxi

(1992).

206. Id.
207. Id. at 425-34.
208. The term Westphalian originated from the treaties underlying the Peace
of Westphalia. See supra note 164; see also Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of
Westphalia: "Involuntary Sovereignty Waiver," Revolutionay InternationalLegal Theoy or
Return to Rule by the Great Powers, 10 UCLAJ. INr'L L. 361 (2005); Osofsky, Climate
Change Litigation as PluralistLegal Dialogue, supra note 105.

209. Myres S. McDougal, W. Michael Reisman &Andrew R. Willard, The World
Community: A Planetary Social Process, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 807, 819-20 (1988).
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Scholarship by Paul Berman, Mark Drumbl, Harold Hongju Koh, Janet Koven Levit, Sally Engle Merry, Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Annelise
Riles, Anne-Marie Slaughter and many other commentators represent a
spectrum of perspectives on what such an enmeshed approach might look
like. At the end closest to the permeable model, and arguably better categorized as falling under it,
Koh's transnational legal process analyzes norm
internalization among a multiplicity of actors across borders. 2 10 Slaughter
takes a further step towards pluralism by positing a new world order in
which the nation-state takes part in horizontal, vertical and intergovern211
mental networks.
At the pluralist end of the spectrum in which enmeshment is more
complete, a multiplicity of conceptions also prevails. Berman argues for
workable hybrid legal structures as the best way of addressing the coexistence of multiple normative communities. 21 2 Drumbl proposes a cosmopolitan pluralist reform of international criminal law that recognizes
horizontal and vertical dimensions of authority and obligation and, in so
doing, develops an approach that would enhance synergy between procedural and substantive aspects of international criminal justice. 213 Levit describes what she terms bottom-up lawmaking processes in which elite
private actors create controlling rules that later become incorporated into
formal law.2 14 Merry explores a new legal realism grounded in "a circulation of institutional prototypes, social movements and reform ideas from
one local space to another in the constitution of various forms of modernity."' 21 5 Rajagopal analyzes the role of formal legal mechanisms in situations of hybridity and the possibilities and constraints of using them to
overcome oppression. 2 16 Riles considers the possibilities for turning infor2 17
mational and institutional networks "inside out."

210. Harold Hongju Koh, Jefferson Memorial Lecture: TransnationalLegal Process
After September 11th, 22 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 337, 339-44 (2004); Harold Hongju
Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996). I have termed Koh's
approach "modified Westphalian" in other scholarly contexts, as distinguished
from pluralist approaches. See Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation
PartII, supra note 182.

211. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 131-215 (2004). I have
elsewhere described Slaughter as lying between modified Westphalian and pluralist approaches. See Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation Part II, supra

note 182.
212. See Berman, supra note 204.
213. See MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROcrTY,
181-205 (2007).

PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

214. SeeJanet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to InternationalLaw Making:
The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 125 (2005).
215. Sally Engle Merry, New Legal Realism and the Ethnography of Transnational
Law, 31 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 975, 992 (2006).
216. See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, The Role of Law in Counter-hegemonic Globalization and Global Legal Pluralism: Lessons from the Narmada Valley Struggle in India, 18
LEIDENJ. INT'L L. 18 (2005).
217. ANNELISE RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT (2001).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol53/iss1/4

42

Osofsky: The Geography of Justice Wormholes: Dilemmas from Property and Cr
2008]

THE GEOGRAPHY OF JUSTICE WORMHOLES

What these theories have in common, despite their diversity in ideological perspective and the extent of their embrace of pluralism, is that
they provide a way out of these justice wormholes through re-envisioning
how the United States fits into governance.2 1 8 The formal enclosed system of the first variation provides a limited set of options for the Danns
and Padilla. If the doors are closed in all of the branches of government,
no alternatives exist that provide the possibility of justice. But in a more
fluid model, in which the United States is continuously interconnected
with multiple actors and levels, formal failure might not spell the end.
This enmeshed model provides the basis for a retelling of the story of
Padilla's "greater success" used to reinforce the enclosed model at the beginning of this part. If Padilla's transfer into the criminal justice system
was a move to avoid Supreme Court review, a possibility raised in Judge
Luttig's reaction, a range of formal and informal advocacy efforts likely
helped to pressure the U.S. government into its decision that such a move
was necessary. 2 19 Although the permeable model acknowledges the power
of these external influences, the enmeshed model takes the further pluralist step of seeing them as completely integrated with the state itself. As a
formal matter, the Executive Branch could invoke "enemy combatant" status again with respect to Padilla, but, as a practical matter, it is unlikely to
do so. Even the courts most amenable to iKs arguments are likely not to be
receptive, as Judge Luttig made clear, and the public pressure would be
enormous. 220 Moreover, as the war in Iraq becomes increasingly unpopular and the Bush Administration is beleaguered in a variety of ways, the
221
Executive Branch may lack the political capital to sustain such pressure.
Such a retelling also provides a glimmer of hope in the Dann case.
Although the United States has yet to acknowledge that is has handled
their case inappropriately (and maybe it never will), the public pressure
may ultimately yield more property rights for Carrie Dann and her family.
At the very least, the publicity has helped to limit some of the worst violations on Western Shoshone land. For example, a planned test of "Divine
218. For additional examples of scholarship engaging pluralist perspectives,
see Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REv. 863 (2006); Diane
Marie Amann, Abu Graib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085 (2005); Diane Marie Amann,
Calling Children to Account: The Proposalfor aJuvenile Chamber in the Special Courtfor
Sierra Leone, 29 PEPP. L. REv. 167 (2001); Elena A. Baylis, Parallel Courts in PostConflict Kosovo, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2007); William W. Burke-White, International
Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 963 (2004); Ralf Michaels, The Re-State-Ment of
Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the Challengefrom Global Legal Pluralism,
51 WAYNE L. REv. 1209 (2005).

219. See Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 587 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied 547
U.S. 1062 (2006).
220. See id.
221. For polling reports over time on the Iraq war, see http://
www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm. For a discussion of some of the issues facing the
Bush Administration, see Dan Balz, Libby Verdict Deals Blow to Bush Administration,
WASH. PosT, Mar. 6, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2007/03/06/AR2007030600836_pf.html.
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Strake," a weapon containing 700 tons of explosives, was canceled in February 2007 after months of public and legal pressure. 2 22 These moments
of "success" do not eliminate the formal wormholes, but they suggest that
networks of interconnection may allow for ways around them. 2 23 Because
the nation-state is not simply being penetrated in this model, but rather is
constituted through these networks, they can help to reconstruct its
spaces.
V.

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS: JUSTICE'S FOUR DEMANDS

The possibilities for justice in these two cases have hinged upon
whether the Danns and Padilla could escape the exceptional categories in
which they had been placed. Padilla's only hope for a modicum of procedural due process, however tainted, was recategorization from enemy combatant to criminal defendant. Similarly, if the Danns could have moved
outside of the Indian Claims Commission framework-in which the reality
that the encroachment began with the ICC proceedings could be ignored-the takings jurisprudence, as noted by the Inter-American Commission, might have provided them with some recourse. As a formal
matter, even the escape that Padilla managed was not a complete one.
Because he was given back due process rights arbitrarily, they could be
taken away again. 22 4 And his sentence reduction barely begins to capture
the ordeal that he suffered or the ways in which his previous "enemy combatant" status may have impacted his trial and the jury's verdict.
Moreover, the relevant exceptional categories are not simply within
the cases themselves. The particularities of these cases occur against a
broader backdrop of United States exceptionalism, in which nation-state
representatives either claim that international norms do not apply or
morph them into almost unrecognizably weakened forms. 22 5 The notion
that the national government can lock people away and throw away any
sort ofjudicial keys on national security grounds, or that it can determine
that land has been taken without engaging the truth of that taking or any
public purpose behind it, challenge minimal threshold considerations of
justice that undergird both the United States and international legal systems. It is no wonder that my international law students each year become
222. News Release, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Cancellation of ProposedDivine Strake Experiment (Feb. 22, 2007), available at http://www.dtra.mil/newsser-

vices/press releases/display.cfm?pr--divine-strake-cancelled.
223. Extensive literature exists on the role that publicity can play in shaping
legal discourse. A full exploration of this discourse is beyond the scope of this
Article. For a discussion of the role that the media plays in dispute resolution, for
example, see Linda L. Putnam, The Media as a Stakeholder in FramingPublic Conflicts,
13 Disp. RESOL. MAC. 12 (2007).
224. For the discourse over the implications of this and other "enemy combatant" cases, see supra notes 106 & 126.
225. For a discussion of U.S. exceptionalism and Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, see
Margaret E. McGuinness, Sanchez-Llamas, American Human Rights Exceptionalism
and the VCCR Norm Portal,11 LEwis & CLARK L. Rzv. 47 (2007).
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less certain that a norm exists against torture, or that international law
imposes meaningful boundaries on the use of force.
This Article argues that an alternative narration of the United States
as an enmeshed space opens possibilities internally and externally for addressing these lacunae in our justice system. In particular, such a model
allows for a focus on four requirements of justice that have been undermined in these cases. Although a law and geography approach is not required to conceptualize these four requirements-many scholars have
traversed similar ground and a rich literature explores justice's contoursits thicker analysis provides a deeper understanding of how basic protections of justice have been eliminated in these cases and what reconstructing them would entail. 226 This approach allows for a version of justice to
emerge in each situation that takes spatio-temporal context into account
and, in so doing, situates the problem amid complex, multiscalar interactions.
First, the "enclosed United States" has done a remarkably poor job of
clarifying the minimum protections for basic civil liberties in these types of
situations. Even after O'Connor's opinion in Hamdi ostensibly articulated
due process protections that would apply to Padilla, he continued to languish in a naval brig in South Carolina. 2 27 The notion that one can shift
from a system of constitutionally guaranteed liberty to nearly unfettered
government discretion through executive order smacks of the very abuses
that the Constitution was created to avoid. 228 Many have had the courage
to take this stance in the post-9-11 environment of fear and their fight, as
demonstrated in the Padilla case, is an important part of what pressures
the United States government to at least justify its actions. A law and geography analysis of these shifts and of the multiple responses to them helps
to reframe dialogues about how minimum protections should vary across
socio-legal contexts.
Such an analysis should acknowledge that the post-9-11 environment
does not represent an entirely new formulation. The roots of our "liberal
democracy" in conquest and the expropriation that continues are not so
different from the post-9-11 abuses. 22 9 Engaging what a liberty baseline
should be requires considering inequality built into more than just the
War on Terror. The eerie parallels between the Dann and Padillacases,
despite their very different substantive contexts, reinforces the need to
think more broadly about what a just legal system would entail. The kind
of interdisciplinary approach modeled in this Article allows for an assessment of the extent to which minimum protections exist at every intersection of place, space and time, and the assumptions about relevant levels of
government that accompany those legal constructs.
226. See supra note 3.

227. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 106.

229. See supra notes 57 & 106.
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Second, an important piece of these minimum guarantees for liberty
involves consistency. Although Emerson aptly noted that "foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds,"23 0 the lack of core consistency in
the legal structures and the judicial application of them that these cases
highlight is troubling. How can we simultaneously debate the nuances of
public use in the post-Kelo environment and accept that for certain populations such a requirement is essentially waived? How can Padilla be an
"enemy combatant" one day and a criminal defendant the next? If the
legal system allows for special categories that treat people as having less
liberty, it at the very least needs to make the contours of those categories
clear and provide some check that makes sure that those with extraordinary power have "gotten it right" in some meaningful way.
A critical aspect of ensuring that consistency is a deeper analysis of
where those contours create risks of wormholes that suddenly transport
people into a new legal time-space. For example, property and Indian law
treat governmental expropriation differently.2 3 l An assessment of the appropriateness of that divergence depends upon understanding the sociolegal context through which the doctrinal approaches emerged and continue to develop. The geographic perspective ensures that such an analysis examines spatio-temporal intersections and the presumptions about
legal structures-both in terms of space and scale-that accompany them.
Third, those deemed outsiders-whether socially or legally-in this
country have repeatedly been treated poorly even when there is no basis
for doing so. The ongoing legacies of conquest and slavery just represent
two of the most extreme versions of a more general pattern. Especially
when a climate of fear prevails, large-scale denials of liberty repeatedly
have occurred in this country.23 2 The period following the 9-11 attacks
was no exception, of course. People who looked too much like "potential
terrorists" were beaten or otherwise discriminated against. 233 Men with

the wrong last name were brought to Guantanamo. 23 4 Women with babies who wanted to ride planes were on many occasions made to drink
their expressed breast milk in order to have the privilege of passing
235
through airport security.
230. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS:
29, 35 (1990).
231. See supra notes 184-85.
232. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.

FIRST AND SECOND SERIES

233. For an analysis of post-9-11 racial profiling, see Sharon L. Davies, Profiling
Terror, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRim. L. 45 (2003); Symposium, Immigration and Civil Rights
After September 11, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 599 (2005).
234. See, e.g., Tim Golden, Voices from Guantdnamo: Brash and Befuddled Files
Reveal Mixed Portrait of Detainees, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 7, 2006, at 2; see also
Richard Bernstein, One Muslim's Odyssey to Guantanamo,N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2005,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/05/internafional/europe/O5prisoner.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.
235. Mother Forced to Drink Breast Milk at Security Check, ABC NEWS ONLINE, Aug.
9, 2002, http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200208/s643976.htm.
Transportation security officials have also forced mothers to discard containers of
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But in telling the most egregious post-9-11 stories, like that of Padilla
and the even-more procedurally challenged Guantanamo detainees, it is
important not to miss the less publicized stories like that of the Danns,
which itself has received far more media attention than many of the other
daily encroachments on indigenous peoples' rights in this country. The
Western Shoshone Defense project, for example, reports regularly on crises facing indigenous peoples which receive little publicity. 2 36 And there

are many "others" who have faced and continue to experience discrimination, both blatant and subtle, on a daily basis. In the not-so-distant past in
Los Angeles, for example, Chinatown was razed to make way for Union
Station, and the destruction of the the Mexican-American Chavez Ravine
neighborhood allowed for the building of Dodger Stadium. 23 7 The postKelo uncertainties about what sort of "public use" the takings jurisprudence requires provides more opportunities for differential treatment unless our legal system is vigilant about problems of equality. 238 This Article
argues that these inequities involve specific confluences of place, space
and time, and how we conceptualize the construction of governmental
spaces impacts the possibilities for change. A law-and-geography approach
assists in a much-needed exploration of this nuance.
Fourth, and underlying the previous three requirements, through
these case examples, the Article attempts to demonstrate the value of a
more complete mapping ofjustice wormholes that accounts for the multiple narratives that are inevitably involved. Does one tell the story of the
Dann case as an unfortunate one in which claimants simply came to the
justice system too late, or as judicial land theft grounded in centuries of
conquest? Is Padilla a very dangerous terrorist that the government needs
leeway to interrogate on the basis of national security, or is he a U.S. citizen deserving of the protections that our Constitution affords those accused of even the most terrible crimes?
The crucial point here is not simply that there are widely divergent
opinions about how to balance liberty and security or even the basic facts
of these situations, but that our legal system needs to embrace a version of
justice that allows for these multiple perspectives.2 39 In practical terms,
pumped breast milk. See, e.g., Blythe Bernhard, Mom's Milk Fuels Fight, ORANGE

Feb. 7, 2007.
236. See Western Shoshone Defense Project, Alerts, http://www.wsdp.org/
alerts.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2007)
CouNTrY REGISTER,

237. See Paul Stanton Kibel, Los Angeles' Cornfield: An Old Blueptint for New
Greenspace, 23 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 275, 304-07 (2004). I worked on the Chinatown

Cornfield case as a Fellow at the Center for Law in the Public Interest from 1999 to
2001.
238. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
239. I have elsewhere, drawing from the work of Edward Soja, see EDWARD W.
SOJA,

THIRDSPACE: JOURNEYS

PLACES

TO

Los

ANGELES

AND

OTHER

REAL-AND-IMAGINED

(1996), explored what it might mean to accept multiple narratives simulta-

neously. See Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation Part II, supra note

182.
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that means at the very least ensuring that everyone receives minimum liberties protection, as well as consistent treatment that comports with with
principles of equality. Ifjustice in our legal system contains a floor, rather
than a wormhole, it makes space for differences in perspective, but not at
the expense of those who are least powerful. We need to map and remap
legal constructions to minimize possibilities for the types of patterns that
these cases contain. This Article provides an example of how this type of
analysis might assist in addressing justice wormholes and the time-spaces
they lead to, but far more exploration of these issues is needed.
Justice wormholes do not have to exist in our legal system. They are
constructed. Those possessing formal lawmaking authority have an obligation to eliminate them, while the rest of us-through formal and informal
means-have the power to confine them. By acknowledging the pervasiveness of these wormholes across areas of law and engaging their socio-legal
context, we open up possibilities for eliminating these spaces in which
people are legally, and sometimes all too literally, "torn apart and crushed
out of existence.

' 2 40

240. See HAWKING, supra note 1, at 86.
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1:

CHRONOLOGY OF DANN PROCEEDINGS

Date Expropriation Proceedings

Trespass Proceedings

Supranational Petitions

1951 Te-Moak Band includes
Dann's land in Indian
Claims Commission (ICC)
compensation claim.
1957 ICC 2holds
hearing on
42
title.
1962 ICC determines 2 that
title
43
is extinguished.
1966 Parties stipulate as to the
date of extinction
in ICC
244
proceedings.
1967 Hearings on valuation2 4 5
regarding ICC claim.
1972 ICC determination of valuation.246
1974 Mary and Carrie Dann
attempt to intervene in
the pending ICC case to
remove their land from
consideration. 2 4 7

Mary and Carrie Dann
cited for trespassing on
the traditional Western
Shoshone land that their
family has 2occupied
since
48
the 1920s.

1975 ICC rules2 their
petition
49
untimely.
1977 ICC announces its final
award of $26,145,189.89 in
compensation to the Western Shoshone
Identifiable
250
Group.

241. W. Shoshone Legal Def. & Ed. Ass'n v. United States, 531 F.2d 495, 496
(Ct. Cl. 1976).
242. Id. at 502.
243. Id.; Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 11 Ind. Cl. Comm. 387, 416 (1962),
available at http://digital.library.okstate.edu/icc/vl 1/iccvl Iap387.pdf.
244. W. Shoshone Identifiable Group v. United States, 29 Ind. Cl. Comm. 5, 7
(1972), available at http://digital.library.okstate.edu/icc/v29/iccv29p005.pdf.
245. Id. Oral argument regarding valuation was held in 1971. Id.
246. Id. at 57.
247. United States v. Dann, 572 F.2d 222, 225 (9th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 470 U.S.
39 (1985).
248. Id. at 223; United States v. Dann, 873 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1987).
249. W. Shoshone Identifiable Group v. United States, 35 Ind. Cl. Comm.
457, 463 (1975), availableat http://digital.library.okstate.edu/icc/v35/iccv35p457.
pdf.
250. W. Shoshone Identifiable Group v. United States, 40 Ind. Cl. Comm.
318, 318 (1977), availableat http://digital.library.okstate.edu/icc/v40/iccv40p453.
pdf.
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Supranational Petitions

Ninth Circuit holds that
Danns can assert aboriginal title as a defense
because the ICC
award is
25 1
not yet final.

1979 Court of Claims affirms
ICC award and certifies2 5 2
the award for payment.
1985

U.S. Supreme Court holds
that payment of funds into
a treasury fund constituted
payment, which thereby
extinguishes tribal aboriginal title. The Court
remands for consideration
of individual
aboriginal
253
rights.

1989

Ninth Circuit holds that
the Danns have individual
aboriginal title to land
occupied by them or their
linear ancestors prior to
1934.254

1991

Danns withdraw claims to
individual aboriginal
rights to avoid separation
from their
tribal
255
claims.

1992

U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) impounds
hundreds of heads
2 5 6of the
Danns' livestock.

251. See Dann, 572 F.2d at 226-27.
252. Temoak Band of W. Shoshone Indians v. United States, 593 F.2d 994,
996, 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
253. United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 49-50 (1985).
254. United States v. Dann, 865 F.2d 1528, 1538 (9th Cir. 1989), amended by,
873 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1989).
255.

PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE

U.N. COM-

MIrEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION CONCERNING THE INTERNA-

FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION,
Annex II,
28(b) (April 2007), available at http://www.wsdp.org/Annex IIto
USPeriodicReport_4-07.pdf.
TIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL

256. Id.

29.
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Date Expropriation Proceedings

Trespass Proceedings

Supranational Petitions

1993

*

2002

* Inter-American Commission makes recommendations in2 6favor
of
0
Danns.
e U.S. government
impounds 225 heads of
cattle and auctions them
26 1
to the highest bidder.

2003

U.S. government rejects
the Inter-American Commission's recommendations.262

2005

Western Shoshone representatives file petition with
Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimi26 3
nation (CERD).

2006

CERD determines that
United States should stay
a variety of plans on 2West64
ern Shoshone lands.

Danns petition the InterAmerican Commission
on
25 7
Human Rights.
* The BLM publishes a
notice stating that it
intends to2 5impound
their
8
livestock.
*The Commission issues
precautionary measures
asking the BLM2 5to
stay the
9
impoundment.

257. Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1
2 (2002).
258. Id.
14-15.
259. Id.
179.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Response of the Government of the United States to October 10, 2002,
Report No. 53/02 Case No. 11.140 (Mary and Carrie Dann), available at http://
www.cidh.org/Respuestas/USA. 11140.htm.
263. Second Request for Urgent Action under the Early Warning Procedure
to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, W. Shoshone People of the Timbisha Shoshone Tribe v. United States (July 29, 2005), available at
http://www.law.arizona.edu/depts/iplp/advocacy/shoshone/documents/CERDSecondRequestforUrgentAction.pdf.
264. UNITED NATIONS, COMMITTEE FOR THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, 68TH SESS., EARLY WARNING AND URGENT ACTION PROCEDURE DECISION 1
(68),
10 (Feb. 20-Mar. 10, 2006), available at http://ohchr.org/english/bodies/
cerd/docs/68decision-USA.pdf.
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Supranational Petitions

2007

United States files periodic report to CERD,
which states, inter alia, that
the CERD recommendations "are inconsistent
with the status of these2 6 5
lands under U.S. law."

2008

CERD issues concluding
observations that reinforce
its recommendations and
express strong regret at
to follow
the U.S. failure
266
up on them.

265. PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE U.N. COMMITtEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION,
334-49 (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.wsdp.org/USPeriodic-Report_407.pdf.
266. CERD Concluding Observations, supra note 43, 1 19.
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Date

2:

CHRONOLOGY OF PADtLLA PROCEEDINGS

"Enemy Combatant" Proceedings

May 8, 2002
June 9, 2002

Padilla designated an "enemy
combatant" and transferred
to Navy
268
brig in Charlottesville.

June 11, 2002

Padilla files habeas petition in
district court for the Southern
District of New York.269

Dec. 4, 2002

Southern District of New York
allows habeas petition to proceed
but also holds that President may
detain U.S. citizens captured in the
United States2 7as0 "enemy
combatants."

Dec. 18, 2003

Second Circuit reverses and holds
that President
cannot detain
2 71
Padilla.
U.S. Supreme Court holds that
Rumsfeld is not a proper
respondent and that New York 2 7 2
federal courts lack jurisdiction.

June 28, 2004

Criminal Proceedings
Padilla detained by federal agents
7
on material witness warrant.9

July 2, 2004

Padilla files a habeas corpus claim
in the district court
for District of
27 3
South Carolina.

Feb. 28, 2005

District court for District of South
Carolina holds that Padilla is
entitled to a hearing on his "enemy
combatant" status and denies2 7 4
inherent Presidential power.

Apr. 7, 2005

Padilla files petition for certiorari
with United States Supreme Court
on the grounds of the length of
detention and of the full briefing
and argument
2 75
before the Second
Circuit.

June 13, 2005

U.S. Supreme
Court denies
27 6
certiorari.

267. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004).

268. Id. at 431-32.
269. Id. at 432
270. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2002),
rev'd sub nom., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
271. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 724 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426
(2004).
272. Padilla,542 U.S. at 441, 447 (2004).
273. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 679 (D.S.C. 2005), rev'd, 423 F.3d
386 (4th Cir. 2005).
274. Id. at 691-92.
275. Brief for Petition for Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment, Padilla v.
Hanft, 545 U.S. 1123 (2005) (No. 04-1342).
276. Padilla v. Hanft, 545 U.S. 1123 (2005).
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Criminal Proceedings

Sept. 9, 2005

Fourth Circuit reverses, holding
has the power to
that the President
2 77
detain Padilla.

Oct. 25, 2005

Padilla files petition for certiorari
278
with U.S. Supreme Court.

Nov. 17, 2005

In light of its transfer request,
discussed in this Appendix as part
of the criminal proceedings, the
justice Department requests that
the Fourth Circuit vacate its Oct.
279
24, 2005 opinion.

Dec. 21, 2005

government's
Fourth Circuit denies
Fourth Circuit denies government's
28 2
2 81
transfer motion.
motion to vacate opinion.
U.S. Supreme Court
2 8 3 authorizes
Padilla's transfer.

Jan. 4, 2006
Apr. 3, 2006

justice Department reports that
Padilla has been indicted by grand
jury in Miami on terrorism and
conspiracy charges, states that this
indictment supersedes the "enemy
combatant" designation, and
transfer to
requests Padilla's
2 80
Florida.

Supreme Court denies certiorari on
on grounds of
habeas petition
284
mootness.

Aug. 18, 2006

Southern District of Florida (S.D.
Fla.) dismisses Count One2 8on5
double jeopardy grounds.

Nov. 17, 2006

S.D. Fla. denies Padilla's motion to
suppress pre-arrest statements at
airport.

Jan. 30, 2007

Circuit reinstates Count
Eleventh
28 6
One.

Apr. 9, 2007

S.D. Fla. denies Padilla's motion to
outrageous government
dismiss for
287
conduct.

May 14, 2007

Padilla's criminal trial begins.

28 8

277. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 397 (4th Cir. 2005).
278. Brief of Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari, Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062
(2005) (No. 05-533).
279. Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Padilla, No. 04-60001-CR, 2007 WL 1079090, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2007).
280. Padilla v. Hanfl, 432 F.3d at 583.
281. Id. at 587.
282. Id.
283. Hanft v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 1084 (2006).
284. Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006).
285. United States v. Padilla, No. 04-CR-60001, 2006 WL 2415946, at *4 (S.D.
Fla. Aug. 18, 2006), rev'd, United States v. Hassoun, 476 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2007).
286. United States v. Hassoun, 476 F.3d 1181, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 2007).
287. United States v. Padilla, No. 04-60001-CR, 2007 WL 1079090, at *1 (S.D.
Fla. Apr. 9, 2007).
288. See Abby Goodnough, After 5 Years, Padilla Goes on Trial in Terror Case,
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2007, at A14.
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Criminal Proceedings

Aug. 16, 2007

Padilla and his co-defendants
convicted on all 2counts
by a
89
unanimous jury.

Jan. 22, 2008

Padilla sentenced
to a term of 208
290
months.

289. Verdict, United States v. Padilla, No. 04-60001, 2007 WL 2349148 (S.D.
Fla. Aug. 16, 2007).
290. See Department of Justice, Press Release, supra note 110.
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